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The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don generated a massive backlash from across the political 
spectrum.1 Kelo’s holding that the Public Use Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment allows the taking of private property for 
transfer to new private owners for the purpose of promoting 
“economic development” was denounced by many on both the 
 
 1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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right and the left. Forty-three states have enacted post-Kelo 
reform legislation to curb eminent domain.2  
The Kelo backlash probably resulted in more new state leg-
islation than any other Supreme Court decision in history. The 
closest competitor is Furman v. Georgia,3 which struck down all 
then-existing state death penalty laws. In response, some thir-
ty-five states and the federal government enacted new death 
penalty statutes intended to conform to Furman’s requirements 
between 1972 and 1976.4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s 2003 decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health mandating same sex marriage under its state constitu-
tion5 has led some thirty other states to enact constitutional 
amendments banning gay marriage between 2003 and 2008.6 
Yet neither Furman nor Goodridge  generated a legislative 
backlash that extended to as many states as Kelo. Moreover, 
the anti-gay marriage amendments cannot be solely attributed 
to the backlash against Goodridge, since they were also spurred 
by litigation that eventually led to pro-gay marriage state court 
decisions in Connecticut and California.7 Thus, a strong case 
can be made that Kelo has drawn a more extensive legislative 
reaction than any other single court decision in American his-
tory.8 
 
 2. For the most complete and up to date listing of state post-Kelo legisla-
tive initiatives, see The Castle Coalition: Citizens Fighting Eminent Domain 
Abuse, Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, http://www.castlecoalition.org/index 
.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (last visited May 17, 2009) [he-
reinafter Castle Coalition]. Other parts of the website also discuss proposed 
and enacted federal legislation. 
 3. 408 U.S. 238, 256–67 (1972). 
 4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 & n.23 (1976) (noting that 
“at least 35 states” and the federal government had enacted new death penalty 
statutes in response to Furman, and listing the state laws in question). 
 5. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 6. For a list of states enacting constitutional bans on same-sex marriage, 
see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL 
UNIONS AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ 
cyf/samesex.htm. 
 7. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 450–52 & n.70 (Cal. 2008), 
superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 
957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008). 
 8. I do not consider cases such as Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust 
Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, and Chi-
sholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI, which were eventually overruled by constitutional amendment. It 
is difficult to say whether one constitutional amendment can be considered a 
more sweeping reaction than numerous state and federal laws. 
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In light of the massive and unprecedented backlash Kelo 
generated, prominent scholars and jurists such as Judge Ri-
chard A. Posner and Chief Justice John Roberts (when ques-
tioned about Kelo at his Senate confirmation), have suggested 
that the political response demonstrates that legislative initia-
tives can protect property owners and that judicial intervention 
may be unnecessary.9 Posner concluded that the political reac-
tion to Kelo is “evidence of [the decision’s] pragmatic sound-
ness.”10 Such arguments dovetail with the traditional view that 
rights supported by majority public opinion will be protected by 
democratic political processes and do not require additional 
protection through judicial review.11 As James Madison fa-
mously wrote in The Federalist No. 10, “[i]f a faction consists of 
less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican prin-
ciple, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by 
regular vote.”12 Only “[w]hen a majority is included in a fac-
tion,” he argued, does “the form of popular government” enable 
it to threaten “the rights of other citizens.”13 
This Article challenges the validity of claims that the polit-
ical backlash to Kelo has provided the same level of protection 
for property owners as would a judicial ban on economic devel-
opment takings. It is the first comprehensive analysis of the 
Kelo backlash to date,14 and finds that the majority of the new-
 
 9. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term–Foreword: A 
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 98 (2005) (claiming that “the strong ad-
verse public and legislative reactions to the Kelo decision” are a justification of 
the decision). At his confirmation hearing before the Senate, then-Judge John 
Roberts commented that the legislative reaction to Kelo shows that “this body 
[Congress] and legislative bodies in the States are protectors of the people’s 
rights as well” and “can protect them in situations where the Court has de-
termined, as it did 5-4 in Kelo, that they are not going to draw that line.” Con-
firmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Jus-
tice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 286 (2005).  
 10. Posner, supra note 9, at 98. 
 11. For perhaps the best-known modern statement of this argument, see 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87–88 (1980) (arguing that judi-
cial review should focus on protecting citizens’ rights to participate in the po-
litical process and minority groups against oppression by the majority). 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 13. Id. 
 14. The most complete earlier published analysis is Timothy Sandefur, 
The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain 
Reform, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709. Sandefur’s article is an excellent contri-
bution to the literature, but was written too soon to take account of the ten re-
ferendum initiatives enacted in 2006, as well as several legislative reforms 
enacted after the summer of 2006. I also provide a very different explanation 
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ly enacted post-Kelo reform laws are likely to be ineffective. It 
also suggests a tentative explanation for the often ineffective 
nature of post-Kelo reform: widespread political ignorance that 
enables state and federal legislators to pass off primarily cos-
metic laws as meaningful reforms. I do not attempt to assess 
either the validity of the Kelo decision or the desirability of 
economic development takings as a policy matter.15 Instead, I 
document the results of the Kelo backlash and provide a provi-
sional explanation for the paucity of effective reform laws. By 
extension, my analysis also calls into question the traditional 
view that judicial review is not needed to protect individual 
rights that enjoy strong majority support from the general pub-
lic. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that 
a number of states have enacted effective post-Kelo reform 
laws. The political response to Kelo was far from completely fu-
tile. 
Part I describes the Kelo decision and then documents the 
widespread backlash it generated. Both state-level and nation-
al surveys show overwhelming public opposition to economic 
development takings—a consensus that cuts across gender, ra-
cial, ethnic, and partisan lines. The decision was also con-
demned by politicians and activists across the political spec-
trum ranging from Ralph Nader16 on the left to Rush Limbaugh 
 
of the pattern of effective and ineffective reforms than Sandefur does, as well 
as providing extensive public-opinion data. An article by Janice Nadler, Shari 
Seidman Diamond, and Matthew M. Patton analyzes public opinion on Kelo, 
but does not examine the legislation passed as a result, and does not explain 
the three anomalies discussed in Part III of this paper. See Janice Nadler et 
al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008). Noel D. 
Campbell, R. Todd Jewell, and Edward J. López’s analysis of post-Kelo reform 
takes into account only thirty-seven state laws, and does not consider the fed-
eral response. See Edward J. López et al., Pass a Law, Any Law, State Legisla-
tive Responses to the Kelo Backlash (June 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1022385. Andrew Morriss’s forthcoming article only consid-
ers reforms enacted by state legislatures, omitting both the federal response 
and state referendum initiatives. See Andrew Morriss, Symbol or Substance? 
An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. LE07-037), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1113582. 
 15. I do address these issues in Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping 
Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 
190–210, 233–44 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Grasping Hand].  
 16. Nader has been a longstanding critic of economic development tak-
ings. See, e.g., Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 
49 VILL. L. REV. 207 (2004) (arguing that they should be banned in most cas-
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on the right.17 Traditional models of democratic politics predict 
that such a broad political consensus is likely to result in effec-
tive legislative action.18 
Part II considers the state and federal political response to 
Kelo. Thirty-six state legislatures have enacted post-Kelo 
reform laws. However, twenty-two of these are largely symbolic 
in nature, providing little or no protection for property owners. 
Several of the remainder were enacted by states that had little 
or no history of condemning property for economic develop-
ment. Only seven states that had recently engaged in signifi-
cant numbers of economic development and blight condemna-
tions have enacted post-Kelo legislative reforms with any real 
teeth. The limited reforms enacted by the federal government 
are likely to be no more effective than most of the state laws. 
The major exceptions to the pattern of ineffective post-Kelo 
reforms are the eleven states that recently enacted reforms by 
popular referendum. Six or seven of these provide meaningful 
new protection for property owners. Strikingly, citizen-initiated 
referendum initiatives have led to the passage of much stronger 
laws than those enacted through referenda initiated by state 
legislatures. 
Part III advances a potential explanation for the pattern of 
ineffective post-Kelo reform. While there is overwhelming pub-
lic support for measures banning economic development tak-
ings, some thirty of the forty-nine states that had not enacted 
reforms before Kelo, 19 as well as the federal government, have 
 
es). For his statement denouncing Kelo, see Ralph Nader, Statement, June 23, 
2005, http://ml.greens.org/pipermail/ctgp-news/2005-June/000507.html (last 
visited May 17, 2009) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of 
New London mocks common sense, tarnishes constitutional law and is an af-
front to fundamental fairness.”). 
 17. For Limbaugh’s denunciation of Kelo, see Rush Limbaugh: Liberals 
Like Stephen Breyer Have Bastardized the Constitution (Free Republic radio 
transcript Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1501453/posts (“Government can kick the little guy out of his and her 
homes and sell those home [sic] to a big developer who’s going to pay a higher 
tax base to the government. Well, that’s not what the takings clause was 
about. It’s not what it is about. It’s just been bastardized, and it gets bastar-
dized because you have justices on the court who will sit there and impose 
their personal policy preferences rather than try to get the original intent of 
the Constitution.”). 
 18. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY 78–82 
(1993) (arguing that state public policy closely follows majority public opinion). 
 19. This figure does not include the state of Utah, which enacted effective 
eminent domain reform prior to Kelo. See discussion of the Utah law in note 85 
and accompanying text. 
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enacted either ineffective reforms, or none at all. I tentatively 
suggest the theory that the ineffectiveness of much post-Kelo 
reform is largely due to widespread political ignorance. Survey 
data collected for this Article shows that the vast majority of 
citizens do not know whether their states have passed post-
Kelo reform legislation and even fewer know whether that leg-
islation is likely to be effective. 
Most voters are “rationally ignorant” of public policy, hav-
ing little incentive to acquire any substantial knowledge about 
the details of government actions. Studies have repeatedly 
shown that most citizens have very little knowledge of politics 
and public policy.20 Many are often ignorant even of many basic 
facts about the political system.21 Such ignorance is a rational 
response to the insignificance of any one vote to electoral out-
comes; if a voter’s only reason to become informed is to ensure 
that she votes for the “best” candidate in order to ensure that 
individual’s election to office, this turns out to be almost no in-
centive at all because the likelihood that any one vote will be 
decisive is infinitesimally small.22  
The publicity surrounding Kelo made the public at least 
somewhat aware of the problem of economic development tak-
ings. But it probably did not lead voters to closely scrutinize the 
details of proposed reform legislation. Few citizens have the 
time or inclination to delve into such matters and many are of-
ten ignorant of the very existence of even the most important 
legislative measures. In Part III, I present survey data showing 
that the vast majority of Americans were indeed ignorant of the 
content of post-Kelo reform legislation in their states. In an 
August 2007 Saint Index survey, only 21% of respondents could 
correctly answer whether or not their state had passed eminent 
domain reform legislation since Kelo, and only 13% both knew 
whether their state had passed legislation and correctly indi-
cated whether that legislation was likely to be effective.23 
 
 20. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Diffi-
culty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1290–304 (2004) [hereinafter Somin, Political Ignorance] 
(summarizing evidence of extensive voter ignorance); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignor-
ance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 413–19 (1998) [herei-
nafter Somin, Voter Ignorance] (same). 
 21. Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 20, at 416–19. 
 22. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 435–38. 
 23. See CTR. FOR ECON. & CIVIC OPINION AT UNIV. OF MASS./LOWELL, THE 
SAINT INDEX POLL qstn. 9 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2007 SAINT 
INDEX]. The survey included 1000 respondents in a nationwide random sam-
 2009] POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO 2107 
 
The political ignorance hypothesis cannot definitively ex-
plain the outcomes of the Kelo backlash. However, it correctly 
predicts three important events: the sudden emergence of the 
Kelo backlash, in spite of the fact that economic development 
takings were already permitted under existing precedent; the 
passage of “position-taking” laws by both state and federal leg-
islators; and the fact that that post-Kelo laws enacted by popu-
lar referendum tended to be much stronger than those enacted 
by state legislatures. No other theory can easily account for all 
three of these seeming anomalies. The political ignorance hypo-
thesis therefore better accounts for the available evidence than 
the leading alternative explanation: that the enactment of ef-
fective post-Kelo reforms was stymied by interest group lobby-
ing. 
I.  KELO AND ITS BACKLASH   
A. THE KELO DECISION24 
The Kelo case arose from the condemnation of ten resi-
dences and five other properties as part of a 2000 “development 
plan” in New London, Connecticut, that sought to transfer the 
property to private developers for the stated purpose of promot-
ing economic growth in the area.25 None of the properties were 
alleged to be “blighted or otherwise in poor condition.”26 The 
condemnations were initiated pursuant to a plan prepared by 
the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a “private 
non-profit entity established . . . to assist the City in planning 
economic development.”27  
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court endorsed the New 
London takings, upheld the economic development rationale for 
condemnation, and mandated broad judicial deference to gov-
ernment decision making on public use issues.28 Justice Ste-
vens’ majority opinion endorsed a “policy of deference to legisla-
tive judgments in this field.”29 The Court rejected the property 
 
ple. See also CTR. FOR ECON. & CIVIC OPINION AT UNIV. OF MASS./LOWELL, 
THE SAINT INDEX POLL (2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2005 SAINT 
INDEX]. 
 24. For a more detailed discussion of Kelo’s holding, from which this brief 
summary is drawn, see Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 223–33.  
 25. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473–77 (2005). 
 26. Id. at 475. 
 27. Id. at 473. 
 28. Id. at 478–85. 
 29. Id. at 480. 
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owners’ argument that the transfer of their property to private 
developers rather than to a public body required any heigh-
tened degree of judicial scrutiny.30 It also refused to require the 
City to provide any evidence that the takings were likely to ac-
tually achieve the claimed economic benefits that provided 
their justification in the first place.31 On all these points, the 
Kelo majority emphasized that courts should not “second-guess 
the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of the devel-
opment plan.”32 
Despite this result, Kelo may have actually represented a 
slight tightening of judicial scrutiny relative to earlier cases 
such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, which held that 
the public use requirement is satisfied so long as “the exercise 
of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceiv-
able public purpose.”33 Moreover, the fact that four Justices not 
only dissented but actually concluded that the economic devel-
opment rationale should be categorically forbidden shows that 
the judicial landscape on public use has changed.34 A fifth, Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy, signed on to the majority opinion, but 
also wrote a concurrence emphasizing that heightened scrutiny 
of eminent domain decisions should be applied in cases where 
there is evidence that a condemnation was undertaken as a re-
sult of “impermissible favoritism” toward a private party.35 The 
fact that four (and possibly five) Justices had serious misgiv-
ings about the Court’s ultra-deferential approach to public use 
issues is a major change from the unanimous endorsement of 
that very position in Midkiff. Although a major defeat for prop-
erty owners, Kelo also represented a small doctrinal step for-
ward. 
B. THE PUBLIC REACTION 
Although Kelo was consistent with existing precedent, the 
decision was greeted with widespread outrage that cut across 
partisan, ideological, racial, and gender lines. The U.S. House 
of Representatives immediately passed a resolution denouncing 
 
 30. Id. at 485–86. 
 31. Id. at 487–88. 
 32. Id. at 488. 
 33. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
 34. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499–505 (O’Conner, J., dissenting); id. at 519–23 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Kelo by a lopsided 365-33 vote.36 In addition to expected denun-
ciations from conservatives and libertarians,37 Kelo was con-
demned by numerous liberal political leaders including former 
President Bill Clinton,38 then-Democratic National Committee 
Chair Howard Dean,39 and prominent African-American politi-
cian and California Representative Maxine Waters.40 The 
NAACP, the AARP, the liberal Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, and others had filed a joint amicus brief in Kelo 
urging the Court to rule in favor of the property owners.41 So 
too had the generally conservative Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty.42  
Public opinion mirrored the widespread condemnation of 
Kelo by political elites and activists. In two national surveys 
conducted in the fall of 2005, 81% and 95% of respondents were 
opposed to Kelo.43 As Table 1 demonstrates, opposition to the 
decision cut across racial, ethnic, partisan, and gender lines.44 
The data in the table comes from two 2005 polls on Kelo, one 
conducted by the Saint Index and one by Zogby. In the Saint 
Index survey, which has the better-worded question of the two 
national polls,45 Kelo was opposed by 77% of men, 84% of wom-
 
 36. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. 2005; 151 CONG. REC. H5592–93 (daily ed. 
June 29, 2005) (enacted); Adam Karlin, A Backlash on Seizure of Property, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 6, 2005, at 1 (describing massive anti-Kelo 
backlash). 
 37. See, e.g., Limbaugh, Liberals Like Stephen Breyer, supra note 17. The 
New London property owners were represented by the Institute for Justice, a 
prominent libertarian public interest law firm. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 471. 
 38. See Eric Kriss, More Seek Curbs on Eminent Domain, SYRACUSE POST-
STANDARD, July 31, 2005, at A16 (noting Clinton’s opposition to the ruling). 
 39. See KSL TV, Howard Dean Speaks to Utah Democrats (KSL television 
broadcast July 16, 2005), available at http://tv.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148& 
sid=6641 (quoting Dean as denouncing “a [R]epublican-appointed Supreme 
Court that decided they can take your house and put a Sheraton Hotel in 
there”). 
 40. See Charles Hurt, Congress Assails Domain Ruling, WASH. TIMES, Ju-
ly 1, 2005, at A1 (quoting Waters denouncing Kelo as “the most un-American 
thing that can be done”).  
 41. See Brief for the National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored 
People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, 545 U.S. 469 (2004) (No. 04-108). 
 42. See Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2004) (No. 
04-108). 
 43. See infra tbl.1. The differences between the two surveys are likely due 
to a difference in question wording. 
 44. See infra tbl.1.  
 45. The Zogby survey question asked respondents whether they agreed 
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en, 82% of whites, 72% of African-Americans, and 80% of His-
panics.46 The decision was also opposed by 79% of Democrats, 
85% of Republicans, and 83% of Independents. Moreover, public 
opposition to Kelo was deep as well as broad. In the Saint Index 
survey, 63% of respondents not only disagreed with the deci-
sion, but said that they did so “strongly.”47 A 2006 Saint Index 
survey found that 71% of respondents supported reform laws 
intended to ban “the taking of private property for private de-
velopment” projects, and 43% supported such laws “strongly.”48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“with the recent Supreme Court ruling that allowed a city in Connecticut to 
take the private property of one citizen and give it to another citizen to use for 
private development?” ZOGBY INT’L, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION 
SURVEY 27 qstn. 28 (Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter ZOGBY INT’L] (emphasis added) 
(on file with author). This wording ignores the fact that the legal rationale for 
Kelo is that the takings are intended to promote “public” development. By con-
trast, the Saint Index survey asked respondents whether they supported or 
opposed the Court’s decision “that local governments can take homes, business 
and private property to make way for private economic development if officials 
believe it would benefit the public.” 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10. 
(emphasis added). 
 46. See infra tbl.1. 
 47. 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10. 
 48. See CTR. FOR ECON. & CIVIC OPINION AT UNIV. OF MASS./LOWELL, THE 
SAINT INDEX POLL qstn. 9 (2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2006 SAINT 
INDEX]; see also Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the 
Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931, 1940 tbl.2 (2007). 
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Table 1: 
National Public Opinion on Kelo 
  Zogby  
Survey49 
 
Saint  
Index Survey 
200550 
% 
Agree  
%  
Disagree 
% 
Agree 
%  
Disagree 
Total 2 95 18 81 
Gender 
 
Male 2 94 22 77 
Female 2 95 14 84 
Racial/Ethnic 
Group51 White 2 94 17 82 
African-American 0 97 28 72 
Asian 0 100 26 68 
Hispanic/Latino 2  98 18 80 
Native American - - 7 93 
Party 
Affiliation 
Democrat 3 94 20 79 
Independent <1 99 17 83 
Republican 3 92 14 85 
Ideology 
Liberal - - 22 77 
Moderate - - 18 81 
Conservative - - 17 82 
 
 
 49. ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 45, at 27 qstn. 28.  Question wording: “Do you 
strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with 
the recent Supreme Court ruling that allowed a city in Connecticut to take the 
private property of one citizen and give it to another citizen to use for private 
development?” Id. The totals given here differ slightly from those published by 
Zogby because they correct a minor clerical error in Zogby’s tabulation.  
 50. 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10. Question wording: “The 
U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local governments can take homes, 
business and private property to make way for private economic development 
if officials believe it would benefit the public. How do you feel about this rul-
ing?” Id. 
 51. The figures for Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans may be unre-
liable because of small sample sizes. See ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 45, at 27 
qstn. 28; 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23 qstn. 10. 
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Table 2: 
State-by-State Public Opinion on Kelo 
State % Agreeing with Kelo % Disagreeing 
Connecticut52 8 88 
Florida53 12 88 
Kansas54 7 92 
 
 52. QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL: 
CONNECTICUT VOTERS SAY 11-1 STOP EMINENT DOMAIN, qstn. 33 (2005), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1296.xml?ReleaseID=821. Question wording: “As 
you may know, the Court ruled that government can use eminent domain to 
buy a person’s property and transfer it to private developers whose commer-
cial projects could benefit the local economy. Do you agree or disagree with 
this ruling? Do you agree/disagree strongly or somewhat?” Id. 
 53. MASON DIXON POLLING & RESEARCH INC., FLORIDA VOTERS OPPOSE 
COURT DECISION ON EMINENT DOMAIN, STRONGLY SUPPORT STATE LAW TO 
PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS 5 (2005), http://www.rg4rb.org/surveyEmDom 
.html. Question wording:  
In that Connecticut case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled government 
can use the power of eminent domain to acquire a person’s property 
and transfer it to private developers whose commercial projects could 
benefit the local economy. Do you agree or disagree with this ruling? 
(Is that strongly agree/disagree or somewhat agree/disagree?). 
Id. 
 54. COLE HARGRAVE SNODGRASS & ASSOCS., A SURVEY OF 400 REGIS-
TERED VOTERS IN KANSAS WITH A 200-SAMPLE SUBSET (2006), http://www 
.castlecoalition.org/pdf/polls/amcns-prosp-poll-KS.pdf. Question wording:  
For years, governments have used the power of eminent domain to 
take control of private property and then use that property for 
schools, hospitals, roads, parks and other public services. Recently, 
the Kansas Supreme Court has expanded the government’s ability to 
use eminent domain to include taking control of private property and 
transferring it not for public services, but to other private interests 
such as shopping centers or car lots. Do you favor or oppose the in-
creased use of eminent domain to include taking private property and 
transferring ownership to other private interests? (After response, 
ask:) Would you say you strongly (favor/oppose) or only somewhat (fa-
vor/oppose)? 
Id. (survey question wording on file with author). 
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New Hampshire55 4 93 
Minnesota56 5 91 
North Carolina57 7 91 
Pennsylvania58 9 90 
Tennessee59 8 86 
 
Table 2 presents results for eight individual state surveys, 
all of which are similar to the national data, with opposition to 
Kelo ranging from 86 to 93 percent of respondents.60 The state 
surveys each use different question wording and therefore are 
 
 55. UNIV. OF N.H. SURVEY CTR., THE GRANITE STATE POLL (2005), 
http://www.unh.edu/survey-center/news/pdf/gsp2005_summer_sc072005.pdf. 
Question wording: 
Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that towns and cities may take 
private land from people and make it available to businesses to devel-
op under the principle of eminent domain. Some people favor this use 
of eminent domain because it allows for increased tax revenues from 
the new businesses and are an important part of economic redeve-
lopment. Other people oppose this use of eminent domain because it 
reduces the value of private property and makes it easier for big busi-
nesses to take land. What about you? Do you think that towns and ci-
ties should be allowed to take private land from the owners and make 
it available to developers to develop or do you oppose this use of emi-
nent domain? 
Id. 
 56. DECISION RES. LTD., MINNESOTA AUTO DEALERS ASSOCIATION SUR-
VEY (2006), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/polls/Survey-for-Strib.pdf. Ques-
tion wording: “What is your opinion–do you support allowing local govern-
ments to use eminent domain to take private property for another private 
development project? Do you feel strongly this way?” Id. 
 57. JOHN WILLIAM POPE CIVITAS INST., JOHN WILLIAM POPE CIVITAS IN-
STITUTE SURVEY (2005), http://www.jwpcivitasinstitute.org/keylinks/poll_ 
august.html. Question wording: “The Supreme Court recently expanded the 
power of government to take private property for non-public use. Do you agree 
or disagree with this expansion of government’s right to take private proper-
ty?” Id. 
 58. LINCOLN INST. OF PUB. OPINION RESEARCH, INC., KEYSTONE BUSINESS 
CLIMATE SURVEY (2006), http://www.lincolninstitute.org/polls.php. Question 
wording: “A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision upheld the taking of private 
residential property by local municipalities to enable private developers to 
build higher tax-yielding structures on that land. Do you agree or disagree 
with this ruling?” Id. 
 59. SOC. SCI. RESEARCH INST. AT THE UNIV. OF TENN., KNOXVILLE, TEN-
NESSEE POLL 6 (2006), http://web.utk.edu/~ssriweb/National_Issues.pdf. Ques-
tion wording: “Sometimes the property taken through eminent domain is given 
to other private citizens for commercial development, rather than for public 
uses, such as road or schools. Would you say you favor or oppose this use of 
eminent domain?” Id. 
 60. See supra tbl.2.  
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not completely comparable to the national surveys or to each 
other. Nevertheless, the national and state by state survey re-
sults collectively paint a picture of widespread and overwhelm-
ing opposition to Kelo and economic development takings. 
The broad anti-Kelo consensus among political leaders, ac-
tivists, and the general public leads one to expect that the rul-
ing would be followed by the enactment of legislation abolish-
ing, or at least strictly limiting, economic-development takings. 
Yet, as we shall see in Part II, such a result has not occurred in 
most states. 
II.  THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE   
With some important exceptions, the legislative response 
to Kelo has fallen short of expectations. At both the state and 
federal level, most of the newly enacted laws are likely to im-
pose few, if any, meaningful restrictions on economic-
development takings. This Part considers the effectiveness of 
the state and federal legislative responses to Kelo. Legislative 
reforms are classified as “effective” so long as they provide 
property owners with at least some significant protection 
against economic-development condemnations beyond that 
available under preexisting law. Thus, even if the new law does 
not categorically ban economic-development takings, it is still 
considered “effective” if it forbids them in some range of cases. 
For example, the Pennsylvania law is classified as effective de-
spite the fact that it excludes, for a period of five years, con-
demnations occurring in that state’s most populous urban 
areas.61 On the other hand, reform laws are classified as “inef-
fective” if they forbid economic-development condemnations but 
essentially allow them to continue under another name, as in 
the case of states with broad definitions of “blight” that allow 
virtually any property to be declared blighted and condemned.62 
A. STATE LAW 
In analyzing the state law reforms enacted in the wake of 
Kelo, it is important to recognize that there is a significant dif-
ference between laws enacted by referendum and those adopted 
by state legislatures: the former are generally much stronger 
 
 61. For a discussion of this law, see infra notes 198–201 and accompany-
ing text. 
 62. For an analysis of these types of ineffective laws, see infra Part 
II.A.1.a. 
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than the latter. Therefore, I analyze the two categories sepa-
rately. The overall results of the analysis are summarized in 
Table 3. Table 4 describes the effectiveness and type of reform 
enacted in each state. 
 
Table 3: 
State Post-Kelo Reform Laws63 
Type of Law Number of 
States 
 
 
Effective 
Enacted by Legislature 14 
 
 
Enacted by Re-
ferendum 
Citizen-initiated 4 
Legislature-
initiated 
2 or 3 
 
 
Ineffective 
Enacted by Legislature 22 
 
 
Enacted by Re-
ferendum 
Citizen-initiated 1 
Legislature-
initiated 
3 or 4 
No Post-Kelo Reforms Enacted 664 
 
Table 4: 
Effectiveness of Reform by State 
State Effectiveness of Reform65 
Alabama  Effective (L) 
Alaska  Ineffective (L) 
Arizona  Effective (CR) 
Arkansas  No Reform 
California  Ineffective (L) 
Colorado  Ineffective (L) 
Connecticut  Ineffective (L) 
 
 63. The total number of states listed adds up to more than forty-three be-
cause a few states had effective legislative reforms followed by ineffective leg-
islative-referendum initiatives; such states are thus counted in both of those 
categories. The state of Florida  enacted legislative and  referendum initiative 
reforms that were both effective and is counted in both “effective” categories. 
Nevada had an effective referendum initiative followed by an ineffective legis-
lative reform. 
 64. This figure does not include the state of Utah, which abolished both 
economic development and blight condemnations before Kelo. See infra note 81 
and accompanying text. I do include the state of Washington, despite the fact 
that it recently enacted a change in its eminent domain law unrelated to Kelo. 
See infra Part II.A.1.b.vii. 
 65. As of January 2008. “L” refers to passed state legislation; “CR” refers 
to passed citizen-initiated referenda; “LR” refers to passed legislature-initiated 
referenda. 
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Delaware  Ineffective (L) 
Florida  Effective (L & LR) 
Georgia  Effective (L & LR) 
Hawaii  No Reform 
Idaho  Effective (L) 
Illinois  Ineffective (L) 
Indiana  Effective (L) 
Iowa  Ineffective (L) 
Kansas  Effective (L) 
Kentucky  Ineffective (L) 
Louisiana  Effective (LR) 
Maine  Ineffective (L) 
Maryland  Ineffective (L) 
Massachusetts  No Reform 
Michigan  Effective (L & LR) 
Minnesota  Effective (L) 
Mississippi  No Reform 
Missouri  Ineffective (L) 
Montana  Ineffective (L) 
Nebraska  Ineffective (L) 
Nevada  Effective (L & CR) 
New Hampshire  Effective (L & LR) 
New Jersey  No Reform 
New Mexico  Effective (L) 
New York  No Reform 
North Carolina  Ineffective (L) 
North Dakota  Effective (CR) 
Ohio  Ineffective (L) 
Oklahoma  No Reform 
Oregon  Effective (CR) 
Pennsylvania  Effective (L) 
Rhode Island  Ineffective (L) 
South Carolina  Ineffective (LR) 
South Dakota  Effective (L) 
Tennessee  Ineffective (L) 
Texas  Ineffective (L) 
Utah  Enacted Prior to Kelo 
Vermont  Ineffective (L) 
Virginia  Effective (L) 
Washington  No Reform 
West Virginia  Ineffective (L) 
Wisconsin  Ineffective (L) 
Wyoming  Effective (L) 
 
Table 5 shows that the enactment of effective post-Kelo 
reform seems unrelated to the degree to which the state in 
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question had previously engaged in private-to-private condem-
nation. That is, only seven of the twenty states with the great-
est number of private-to-private takings between 1998 and 
2002 have enacted effective post-Kelo reforms. 
Table 5 is based on a study by the Institute for Justice, the 
libertarian public interest law firm that represented the prop-
erty owners in Kelo.66 The Institute for Justice figures are far 
from definitive. They likely underestimate the prevalence of 
condemnations for the benefit of private parties because they 
were compiled from news reports and court filings.67 Many cas-
es are unpublished, and many other condemnations go unre-
ported in the press.68 Some of the condemnations in the study 
involved the taking of multiple properties, sometimes hundreds 
at a time, while others only applied to a small amount of land.69 
Finally, the figures unfortunately do not separate economic-
development takings from other private-to-private condemna-
tions. Nonetheless, they do give a rough indication of which 
states engage in private-to-private condemnations more than 
others. And it is noteworthy that states with a relatively large 
number of private-to-private takings are less likely to have 
enacted effective post-Kelo reforms than others.70 
A similar picture emerges if we compare states with large 
numbers of threatened private-to-private condemnations to 
those with few, or if we analyze the data with respect to the 
frequency of actual or threatened condemnations relative to the 
size of the state’s population.71 In each case, states with rela-
tively large numbers of actual or threatened condemnations 
were not more likely to enact effective reforms than those with 
few or none. Only seven of the twenty states with the most 
threatened condemnations have enacted effective reforms.72 
The same is true of just seven of the twenty states with the 
 
 66. See DANA BERLINER, INST. FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE 
GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (2003), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED_report.pdf. 
Berliner was one of the two Institute for Justice lawyers who represented Su-
sette Kelo and the other New London property owners. See Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, at 469 (2005).  
 67. See BERLINER, supra note 66, at 2.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 3. 
 70. See infra tbl.5. 
 71. See infra tbls.A1–A3. 
 72. See infra tbl.A1. 
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most private-to-private condemnations relative to population 
size.73 
 
Table 5: 
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of Private-to-Private 
Condemnations, 1998-2002 
State No. of  
Takings74 
Effectiveness of Reform75 
Pennsylvania 2,517 Effective (L) 
California 223 Ineffective (L) 
Kansas 155 Effective (L) 
Michigan 138 Effective (L & LR) 
Maryland 127 Ineffective (L) 
Ohio 90 Ineffective (L) 
Florida 67 Effective (L & LR) 
Virginia 58 Effective (L) 
New York 57 No Reform 
New Jersey 51 No Reform 
Connecticut 31 Ineffective (L) 
Tennessee 29 Ineffective (L) 
Colorado 23 Ineffective (L) 
Oklahoma 23 No Reform 
Missouri 18 Ineffective (L) 
Rhode Island 12 Ineffective (L) 
Arizona 11 Effective (CR) 
Texas 11 Ineffective (L) 
Washington 11 No Reform 
Minnesota 9 Effective (L) 
Alabama 8 Effective (L) 
Illinois 8 Ineffective (L) 
West Virginia 8 Ineffective (L) 
Kentucky 7 Ineffective (L) 
Louisiana 5 Effective (LR) 
Massachusetts 5 No Reform 
Indiana 4 Effective (L) 
Iowa 4 Ineffective (L) 
Mississippi 3 No Reform 
Nevada 3 Effective (L & CR) 
Maine 2 Ineffective (L) 
Arkansas 1 No Reform 
Nebraska 1 Ineffective (L) 
North Carolina 1 Ineffective (L) 
North Dakota 1 Effective (CR) 
 
 73. See infra tbl.A2. 
 74. Some takings affected more than one property. 
 75. As of January, 2009.  
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Alaska 0 Ineffective (L) 
Delaware 0 Ineffective (L) 
Georgia 0 Effective (L & LR) 
Idaho 0 Effective (L) 
South Dakota 0 Effective (L) 
Wyoming 0 Effective (L) 
Hawaii 0 No Reform 
Montana 0 Ineffective (L) 
New Hampshire 0 Effective (L & LR) 
New Mexico 0 Effective (L) 
Oregon 0 Effective (CR) 
South Carolina 0 Ineffective (LR) 
Utah 0 Enacted Prior to Kelo 
Vermont 0 Ineffective (L) 
Wisconsin 0 Ineffective (L) 
 
To be sure, three of the four states with the largest number 
of takings—Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Michigan—have 
enacted effective reforms. However, the significance of this fact 
is diminished by the reality that Pennsylvania’s reform law has 
a major loophole exempting those parts of the state where most 
condemnations occur.76 Michigan’s reform law, while quite 
strong,77 came on the heels of a state supreme court decision 
that had already banned Kelo-style economic development tak-
ings.78  
In addition, the Institute for Justice figures are only ap-
proximate, and it is likely that they underestimate the number 
of economic-development condemnations in some states.79 It is 
therefore difficult to know whether Pennsylvania, Kansas, and 
Michigan really were three of the top four states in this catego-
ry. Furthermore, it would be unwise to draw broad conclusions 
from just three cases, especially in light of the fact that nearly 
all the other states with large numbers of private-to-private 
takings in the Institute for Justice study either enacted ineffec-
 
 76. See infra notes 192–196 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 78. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 784 (Mich. 2004). 
For an analysis of Hathcock, see Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public 
Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005. The new Michigan law does, however, go 
beyond Hathcock in limiting blight condemnations that might not have been 
prevented by the court decision. See id. at 1033–39. 
 79. See, for example, infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the underestima-
tion of the number of takings in Minnesota. 
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tive reforms or none at all.80 For these reasons, the reforms in 
these states are not compelling evidence for the theory that the 
effectiveness of post-Kelo reform was driven by the extent to 
which the state in question made use of economic development 
condemnations prior to Kelo.  
1. Reforms Enacted by State Legislatures 
As of early 2009, thirty-six state legislatures have enacted 
post-Kelo reforms. The state of Utah effectively banned econom-
ic development takings in a statute enacted several months be-
fore Kelo was decided by the Supreme Court.81 However, twen-
ty-two of the thirty-six new state laws provide little or no 
protection for property owners against economic development 
takings. Only fourteen state legislatures have enacted laws 
that either ban economic development takings or significantly 
restrict them. The seventeen ineffective state laws are of sever-
al types. By far the most common are laws that forbid takings 
for economic development but in fact allow them to continue 
under another name, such as “blight” or “community develop-
ment” condemnations. Other post-Kelo reforms lack teeth be-
cause they either forbid only those takings that are for “pri-
vate” development (thus permitting localities to condemn under 
the standard theory that any such takings are really intended 
to promote “public” benefits) or are purely symbolic in nature. 
a. Laws with Broad Exemptions for Blight Condemnations 
Sixteen states have enacted post-Kelo reform laws whose 
effect is largely negated by exemptions for blight condemna-
tions under definitions of blight that make it possible to include 
almost any property in that category. This is by far the most 
common factor undermining the potential effectiveness of post-
Kelo reform laws.  
Early blight cases in the 1940s and 1950s upheld condem-
nations in areas that fit the layperson’s intuitive notion of 
blight: dilapidated, dangerous, or disease-ridden neighbor-
hoods. For example, in Berman v. Parker, the well-known 1954 
 
 80. See supra tbl.5. 
 81. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-4-202 (2004) (current version at UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (2006)); see also Henry Lamb, Utah Bans Eminent 
Domain Use by Redevelopment Agencies, 8 ENV’T & CLIMATE NEWS, June 
2005, at 1 (describing the politics behind the Utah law). In March 2006, Utah 
partially rescinded its ban on blight condemnations. See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 17C-2-503 (amended 2007). 
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case in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of blight condemnations under the Federal Public Use Clause, 
the condemned neighborhood was characterized by “[m]iserable 
and disreputable housing conditions.”82 According to the Court, 
“64.3% of the dwellings [in the area] were beyond repair, 18.4% 
needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of 
the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% 
lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, 
[and] 83.8% lacked central heating.”83  
More recently, however, many states have expanded the 
concept of blight to encompass almost any area where economic 
development could potentially be increased. For example, re-
cent state appellate court decisions have held that Times 
Square in New York City,84 and downtown Las Vegas85 are 
blighted, thereby justifying condemnations undertaken to ac-
quire land for a new headquarters for the New York Times and 
parking lots for a consortium of local casinos, respectively. All 
but three states permit condemnation for blight and most of 
these define the concept broadly.86 For decades, courts have in-
terpreted broad definitions of blight in ways that allow the con-
demnation of almost any property; if virtually any property can 
be condemned as blighted, a ban on economic development tak-
ings would be essentially irrelevant.87 
Sixteen post-Kelo reform laws continue this pattern, using 
definitions of blight that are either identical to those enshrined 
in preexisting law or very similar to them. These reform laws 
thereby undermine the effectiveness of their bans on private-to-
private condemnations for economic development. Ten of these 
 
 82. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).  
 83. Id. 
 84. In re W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 
121, 125–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).  
 85. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–
15 (Nev. 2003).  
 86. See generally Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of 
Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 394–96 (2000) 
(describing definitions of blight used in various states). This article is slightly 
out-of-date because it does not account for the abolition of blight condemna-
tions by Florida, New Mexico, and Utah, as well as the tightening of the defi-
nition of blight by other states in the aftermath of Kelo. See infra notes 175–
178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant laws; see also Colin 
Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the 
Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 305–07 (2004) (de-
scribing very broad use of blight designations to facilitate condemnation). 
 87. See Gordon, supra note 86, at 320–23; Luce, supra note 86, at 397–
400. 
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followed a standard pattern of defining blight as any obstacle to 
“sound growth” or an “economic or social liability.” Six have 
somewhat more idiosyncratic but comparably broad definitions 
of blight. 
 i. Defining Blight to Include Any Obstacle to “Sound 
Growth” or an “Economic or Social Liability” 
Ten state Post-Kelo, laws leave in place definitions of 
blight that include any area where there are obstacles to 
“sound growth” or conditions that constitute an “economic or 
social liability.” These include reform laws in Alaska,88 Colora-
do,89 Missouri,90 Montana,91 Nebraska,92 North Carolina,93 
 
 88. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(a)(2) (2008) (exempting preexisting public 
uses declared in state law from a ban on economic development takings); Id. 
§ 18.55.950(2) (“‘[B]lighted area’ means an area, other than a slum area, that 
by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty 
lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness, unsanitary 
or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or improvements, tax or special as-
sessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land, improper subdivi-
sion or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions that endanger life or 
property by fire and other causes, or any combination of these factors, sub-
stantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards the 
provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social lia-
bility and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its 
condition and use.”). 
 89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2008) (defining “blight” to include 
any condition that “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the 
municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes 
an economic or social liability, and is a menace to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare”); Id. § 38-1-101(2)(b) (allowing condemnation for the “era-
dication of blight”). 
 90. MO. REV. STAT. § 100.310.2 (2008) (defining “blighted area” as “an 
area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street 
layout, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, 
improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such 
factors, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an 
economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals or 
welfare”); Id. § 353.020.2 (defining “blighted area” as “that portion of the 
city . . . that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or 
physical deterioration have become economic and social liabilities, and that 
such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or 
inability to pay reasonable taxes”); id. § 523.271.2 (exempting blight condem-
nations from ban on “economic development” takings). A recent Missouri Su-
preme Court decision has construed section 353.020 as requiring separate 
proof of “social liability” that goes beyond merely showing the existence of an 
“economic liability,” in the sense of an obstacle to future growth and reduction 
of tax revenue. See Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Mint Prop., 225 S.W.3d 431, 
433 (Mo. 2007). The decision notes, however, that proof of the existence of “so-
cial liability” might be demonstrated by providing evidence “concerning the 
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Ohio,94 Texas,95 Vermont,96 and West Virginia.97 Obviously, any 
 
public health, safety, and welfare,” which in this case was totally absent in the 
record. Id. at 433–35. In any event, Missouri local governments also have the 
power to condemn property based on the definition of blight in another statute 
that defines the concept as requiring proof of the existence of either an “eco-
nomic” or a “social liability.” See State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Indus. Ex-
pansion Auth., 517 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo. 1975) (noting that industrial develop-
ment projects undertaken in accordance with this section include the power to 
acquire property through the use of eminent domain). 
 91. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 7-15-4206(2) (2007) (“‘Blighted area’ means an 
area that is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, 
juvenile delinquency, and crime, that substantially impairs or arrests the 
sound growth of the city or its environs, that retards the provision of housing 
accommodations, or that constitutes an economic or social liability or is detri-
mental or constitutes a menace to the public health, safety, welfare, and mor-
als in its present condition and use by reason of: (a) the substantial physical 
dilapidation, deterioration, age obsolescence, or defective construction, ma-
terial, and arrangement of buildings or improvements, whether residential or 
nonresidential.”); id. § 70-30-102 (banning economic development condemna-
tions, but retaining most of the broad definition of blight outlined in section 7-
15-4206(2)(a)). 
 92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2103 (2007) (defining blight as any area in a 
condition that “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the com-
munity, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an 
economic or social liability” and has “deteriorating” structures); id. § 76-701 
(exempting “blight” condemnations from ban on economic development tak-
ings). 
 93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-503(2) (2007) (“‘Blighted area’ shall mean an 
area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements (or which 
is predominantly residential in character), and which, by reason of dilapida-
tion, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, 
light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population and over-
crowding, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such 
factors, substantially impairs the sound growth of the community, is conducive 
to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency 
and crime, and is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.”); 
id. § 160A-515 (exempting blight condemnations from restrictions on economic 
development takings). 
 94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.08, 303.26(E) (LexisNexis 2008) (“‘Blighted 
area’ and ‘slum’ mean an area in which at least seventy per cent of the parcels 
are blighted parcels and those blighted parcels substantially impair or arrest 
the sound growth of the state or a political subdivision of the state, retard the 
provision of housing accommodations, constitute an economic or social liabili-
ty, or are a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . . . .”). To 
qualify as a “blighted parcel,” a parcel must meet at least two of seventeen va-
gue and general conditions such as “deterioration,” “age and obsolescence,” 
“faulty lot layout,” being “located in an area of defective or inadequate street 
layout,” and “overcrowding of buildings.” Id. § 108.(B)(2)(a-p). Virtually any 
area is likely to meet two or more of these criteria. See also S.B. 167, § 2(A), 
126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005) (exempting blight condemnations from tempo-
rary moratorium on economic development takings). 
 95. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (Vernon 2008) (exempting 
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obstacle to economic development can easily be defined as im-
pairing “sound growth,” making this definition of blight broad 
enough to justify virtually any condemnation under an econom-
ic development rationale. Similarly, an impediment to economic 
development can be considered an “economic or social liability.” 
Several of the state laws listed above require that, in order to 
be blighted, an area that is an “economic or social liability” 
must also be “a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare.”98 This additional condition is unlikely to be a signifi-
cant constraint because almost any condition that impedes eco-
nomic development could be considered a “menace to the pub-
lic . . . welfare.”  
For example, under Florida’s pre-reform blight statute, 
which used this exact wording, the Florida Supreme Court 
found that even undeveloped land could be considered 
“blighted” if its current state impedes future development.99 
The Supreme Court of Arizona has similarly described this lan-
guage—which was present in Arizona’s pre-Kelo blight sta-
tute—as an “extremely broad definition of . . . ‘blighted area’” 
that gives condemning authorities “wide discretion in deciding 
what constitutes blight.”100 Significantly, searches on Westlaw 
and Lexis do not reveal any published state court opinions that 
 
condemnations “to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society from 
slum or blighted areas” from the ban on economic development takings); TEX. 
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 374.003(3) (Vernon 2005) (“‘Blighted area’ means an 
area that is not a slum area, but that, because of deteriorating buildings, 
structures, or other improvements; defective or inadequate streets, street 
layout, or accessibility; unsanitary conditions; or other hazardous conditions, 
adversely affects the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . . . or results in 
an economic or social liability to the municipality.”). 
 96. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040 (2008) (exempting blight condemnations 
from ban on economic development takings); Id. tit. 24, § 3201(3) (defining 
“blighted area” to include any planning or layout condition that “substantially 
impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of 
housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a 
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare”). 
 97. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-3 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining “blighted 
area” as an area which, due to a number of factors such as deterioration or in-
adequate street layout, “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of 
the community, retards the provision of housing accommodations or consti-
tutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safe-
ty, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use”); Id. § 16-18-6 (exempt-
ing blight condemnation from ban on redevelopment takings).  
 98. See supra notes 88–97. 
 99. Panama City Beach Cmty. Redev. Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 
668–69 (Fla. 2002). 
 100. City of Phoenix v. Superior Ct., 671 P.2d 387, 391–93 (Ariz. 1983). 
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interpret this language as a meaningful constraint on the scope 
of blight condemnations. There are no published court decisions 
using it to strike down an attempted blight taking of any 
kind.101 
 ii. Other Broad Blight Exemptions 
Eight other states have similarly broad blight exemptions, 
albeit with different wording. Illinois’ new law exempts blight 
condemnations from its ban on economic development takings 
and retains its preexisting definition of blight,102 which defined 
a blighted area as one where “industrial, commercial, and resi-
dential buildings or improvements are detrimental to the public 
safety, health, or welfare because of a combination of 5 or more 
of the following factors.”103 The list of factors include dilapida-
tion; obsolescence; deterioration; below minimum code stan-
dards; illegal use of structures; excessive vacancies; lack of ven-
tilation, light, or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; 
excessive land coverage and overcrowding of structures and 
community facilities; deleterious land use or layout; environ-
mental clean-up; lack of community planning; or an assessed 
value that has declined three of the last five years.104 The con-
cept of “detriment” to “public welfare” is extremely broad and 
surely includes detriment to local economic welfare and devel-
opment. The list of factors includes numerous conditions, such 
as deterioration, “deleterious land use or layout,” lack of com-
munity planning, a declining assessed value, “excessive” land 
coverage, and obsolescence—that exist to some degree in most 
communities.105 Thus, the Illinois law would forbid few if any 
economic development takings. 
The new Nevada statute bans all private-to-private con-
demnations,106 but leaves open an exception for blight tak-
ings.107 Current Nevada law defines blight very broadly, allow-
ing an area to be declared blighted so long as it meets at least 
 
 101. As far as I am aware, there are no unpublished decisions with such a 
holding. 
 102. S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem., § 1-1-5 (Ill. 2006). 
 103. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1) (2006).  
 104. Id. 
 105. The statute does require that at least five of the listed factors be 
present. Id. However, this is little obstacle to obtaining a blight declaration 
because so many are conditions that exist in almost any area. 
 106. NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(1)(q) (2007). 
 107. Id.  
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four of eleven factors.108 The possible factors include at least six 
that are extremely broad and could apply to almost any area: 
“economic dislocation, deterioration or disuse,” “subdividing 
and sale of lots of irregular form and shape and inadequate size 
for proper usefulness and development,” “[t]he laying out of lots 
in disregard of the contours and other physical characteristics 
of the ground,” “[t]he existence of inadequate streets, open 
spaces and utilities,” “[a] growing or total lack of proper utiliza-
tion of some parts of the area, resulting in a stagnant and un-
productive condition of land,” and “[a] loss of population and a 
reduction of proper use of some parts of the area, resulting in 
its further deterioration and added costs to the taxpay-
er . . . .”109 In 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court used this sta-
tute to declare downtown Las Vegas a blighted area, thereby 
justifying the condemnation of property for transfer to several 
casinos so that they could build new parking facilities for their 
customers.110 However, the Nevada statute was enacted in the 
aftermath of a referendum that approved a state constitutional 
amendment that will eventually provide much stronger protec-
tion for property owners than permitted under the legislative 
statute.111 
Kentucky’s post-Kelo reform law likewise retains a very 
broad preexisting definition of blight.112 The law allows con-
demnation of property for “urban renewal and community de-
velopment” in “blighted” or “slum” areas.113 An area can be con-
sidered “blighted” or a “slum” if there are flaws in the “size” or 
“usefulness” of property lots in the area, or if there are condi-
tions “constitut[ing] a menace to the public health, safety and 
welfare.”114  
Maine’s reform statute also incorporates a broad definition 
of blight from prior legislation.115 Prior Maine law defined 
 
 108. Id. § 279.388. 
 109. Id. 
 110. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–
15 (Nev. 2003). However, it should be noted that the 2003 version of section 
279.388 required the presence of only one of the eleven factors to allow an area 
to be declared “blighted.” Id. at 6 n.8. 
 111. See infra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of Nevada’s referendum initia-
tive. 
 112. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.340(2) (LexisNexis 2004). 
 113. Id. § 99.370(6). 
 114. Id. § 99.340. 
 115. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5101 (1964); see also id. tit. 1, § 816 
(2008) (exempting blight condemnations from ban on economic development 
condemnations). 
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blight as including areas in which properties suffer from 
“[d]ilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence.”116 For con-
demnations that further “urban renewal” projects, detriment to 
“public health, safety, morals or welfare” may lead to a blight 
designation.117 Condemnation for “community development” 
can occur in areas that are considered blighted under the same 
definition, except that threats to “morals” are not included.118 
The new Tennessee law attempts to tighten the definition 
of “blight,” but ultimately leaves it very broad. Under the new 
statute: 
“Blighted areas” are areas (including slum areas) with buildings or 
improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, over-
crowding, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, deleterious 
land use, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental 
to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community. Welfare of 
the community does not include solely a loss of property value to sur-
rounding properties nor does it include the need for increased tax rev-
enues.119 
The inclusion of the term “welfare of the community” 
seems to leave the door open to most economic development 
takings; after all, economic development is generally considered 
a component of community “welfare.” This conclusion is not 
much affected by the stipulation that “‘[w]elfare of the commu-
nity’ . . . does not include solely a loss of property value to sur-
rounding properties nor does it include the need for increased 
tax revenues.”120 Condemnations that promote “development” 
by increasing property values are still permitted so long as 
there is some other claim of even a small economic benefit, such 
as an increase in employment, savings, or investment. Indeed, 
the provision of jobs and attraction of outside investors is a 
standard rationale for economic development condemnations.121 
Rhode Island’s reform law is the last post-Kelo law enacted 
to date.122 It mandates that “[n]o entity subject to the provi-
 
 116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5101 (1964). 
 117. Id. § 5102. 
 118. Id. § 5201. 
 119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (2008). 
 120. Id. 
 121. The best-known case is Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of De-
troit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 
684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), where some 4000 were uprooted in order to pro-
vide a site for a new General Motors factory in Detroit that was expected to 
create 6000 new jobs. Id. n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). For discussion, see 
generally Somin, supra note 78. 
 122. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64.12-1 (Supp. 2008).  
 2128 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:2100 
 
sions of the chapter shall exercise eminent powers to acquire 
any property for economic development purposes unless it has 
explicit authority to do so and unless it conforms to the provi-
sions of this section.”123 The requirement of having “explicit au-
thority” is not a meaningful constraint because state law al-
ready gives virtually all local government the power to 
condemn property in “arrested blighted areas,” “deteriorated 
blighted areas,” and “slum blighted areas.”124 All three of these 
concepts are defined extremely broadly.125 The new Rhode Isl-
 
 123. Id. § 42-64.12-7. 
 124. Id. § 45-31-6 (1999). 
 125. Id. § 45-31-8.  An “arrested blighted area” is defined as:  
[A]ny area which, by reason of the existence of physical conditions in-
cluding, but not by way of limitation, the existence of unsuitable soil 
conditions, the existence of dumping or other insanitary or unsafe 
conditions, the existence of ledge or rock, the necessity of unduly ex-
pensive excavation, fill or grading, or the necessity of undertaking 
unduly expensive measures for the drainage of the area or for the 
prevention of flooding or for making the area appropriate for sound 
development, or by reason of obsolete, inappropriate, or otherwise 
faulty platting or subdivision, deterioration of site improvements, in-
adequacy of utilities, diversity of ownership of plots, or tax delinquen-
cies, or by reason of any combination of any of the foregoing condi-
tions, is unduly costly to develop soundly through the ordinary 
operations of private enterprise and impairs the sound growth of the 
community. 
Id. § 45-31-8(2). A “deteriorated blighted area” is: 
[A]ny area in which there exist buildings or improvements, either 
used or intended to be used for living, commercial, industrial, or other 
purposes, or any combination of these uses, which by reason of: 
  (i) Dilapidation, deterioration, age, or obsolescence; 
  (ii) Inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open 
spaces, and recreation facilities; 
  (iii) High density of population and overcrowding, 
  (iv) Defective design or unsanitary or unsafe character or condi-
tions of physical construction; 
  (v) Defective or inadequate street and lot layout; and 
  (vi) Mixed character, shifting, or deterioration of uses to which 
they are put, or any combination of these factors and characteristics, 
are conducive to the further deterioration and decline of the area to 
the point where it may become a slum blighted area as defined in 
subdivision (18), and are detrimental to the public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare of the inhabitants of the community and of the 
state generally. A deteriorated blighted area need not be restricted to, 
or consist entirely of, lands, buildings, or improvements which of 
themselves are detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare, but may consist of an area in which these condi-
tions exist and injuriously affect the entire area. 
Id. § 45-31-8(6). Finally, a “slum blighted area” is: 
[A]ny area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improve-
ments, either used or intended to be used for living, commercial, in-
dustrial, or other purposes, or any combination of these uses, which 
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and reform law explicitly reaffirms the power of local redeve-
lopment agencies to condemn property under these blight sta-
tutes.126 Indeed, the new law may actually increase the power 
of redevelopment agencies to condemn property, because it al-
lows them to take any property for the purposes of “correcting 
conditions adversely affecting public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare,” and this authorization is “not limited to” areas that 
have been declared blighted.127 
Iowa’s and Wisconsin’s post-Kelo laws are somewhat ambi-
guous cases, though tending toward a broad definition of blight. 
The Iowa statute includes a less broad blight exemption but 
one that might still be extensive enough to allow a wide range 
of economic development takings. The Iowa statute permits 
condemnation of blighted areas, and defines blight as: 
[T]he presence of a substantial number of slum or deteriorated struc-
tures; insanitary or unsafe  conditions; excessive and uncorrected de-
terioration of site or other improvements; tax or special assessment 
delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land; defective or unusual 
conditions of title; or the existence of conditions which endanger life 
or property by fire and other causes; or  the existence of conditions 
which retard the provision of housing accommodations for low or 
 
by reason of:  
  (i) dilapidation, deterioration, age, or obsolescence;  
  (ii) inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open 
spaces, and recreation facilities;  
  (iii) high density of population and overcrowding;  
  (iv) defective design or unsanitary or unsafe character or condi-
tion of physical construction;  
  (v) defective or inadequate street and lot layout; and  
  (vi) mixed character or shifting of uses to which they are put, or 
any combination of these factors and characteristics, are conducive to 
ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delin-
quency, and crime; injuriously affect the entire area and constitute a 
menace to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of the inhabi-
tants of the community and of the state generally. A slum blighted 
area need not be restricted to, or consist entirely of, lands, buildings, 
or improvements which of themselves are detrimental or inimical to 
the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, but may consist of an 
area in which these conditions predominate and injuriously affect the 
entire area. 
Id. § 45-31-8(18). 
 126. Id. § 42-64.12-6(d) (Supp. 2008) (noting the power to condemn proper-
ty in order to “[e]liminat[e] an identifiable public harm and/or correct[ ] condi-
tions adversely affecting public health, safety, morals, or welfare, including, 
but not limited to, the elimination and prevention of blighted and substandard 
areas, as defined by chapter 45-31”). 
 127. Id. 
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moderate income families, or is a menace to the public health and 
safety in its present condition and use.128 
Whether or not this is a broad definition of blight depends 
on the definition of such terms as “deteriorated structures” and 
“excessive and uncorrected deterioration of site.” If the concept 
of “deterioration” is defined broadly, then virtually any area 
could be considered blighted because all structures gradually 
deteriorate over time. Since one of the conditions justifying a 
blight designation is “the presence of a substantial number of 
slum or deteriorated structures,”129 we might presume that the 
term “deteriorated” can be applied to structures that are not di-
lapidated enough to be considered “slum[s].” Otherwise, the in-
clusion of the term “deteriorated” would be superfluous. Thus, 
it is possible that courts will interpret the Iowa statute to per-
mit a very broad definition of blight by virtue of the use of the 
term “deteriorated.” 
In addition, it is possible that a wide range of areas could 
be considered blighted by applying the statute’s provision that 
an area is blighted if there are “conditions which retard the 
provision of housing accommodations for low or moderate in-
come families.”130 Since the law does not state that the “retar-
dation” must be of significant magnitude, it is possible that the 
existence of conditions that impair the provision of low and 
moderate income housing even slightly might be enough to jus-
tify a blight designation. 
The Wisconsin statute is more restrictive than Iowa’s. It 
too exempts blight condemnations from its ban on economic de-
velopment takings and defines blight broadly. The definition 
includes: 
[A]ny property that, by reason of abandonment, dilapidation, deteri-
oration, age or obsolescence,  inadequate provisions for ventilation, 
light, air, or sanitation, high density of population and overcrowding, 
faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or useful-
ness,  unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or other 
improvements, or the existence of conditions that endanger life or 
property by fire or other causes, or any combination of such factors, is 
detrimental to the public health, safety, or welfare.131 
However, the statute also exempts residential property 
consisting of a single dwelling unit from condemnation for 
blight alleviation unless it has: 1) “been abandoned” or 2) “the 
 
 128. IOWA CODE § 6A.22 (2008). 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. 
 131. WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(a) (2007–08). 
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crime rate in [or near] the property is at least 3 times the crime 
rate in the remainder of the municipality.”132 Thus, the Wis-
consin law provides considerable protection for single-family 
homes, but allows nonresidential properties and many multi-
family homes to be condemned under a broad definition of 
blight. 
b. State Laws that Are Ineffective for Other Reasons133 
While broad blight exemptions are by far the most common 
type of loophole in post-Kelo laws, several post-Kelo statutes 
are ineffective for other reasons. The most notable of these are 
those of California, Connecticut, Maryland, and Delaware. The 
Texas and Ohio laws, already briefly discussed above, also have 
major loopholes besides those created by their blight exemp-
tions. Each of these situations is analyzed below. I also briefly 
consider Washington’s new eminent domain law, even though 
the latter is not truly a response to Kelo. 
 i. California 
In September 2006, the California state legislature enacted 
a package of five post-Kelo eminent domain reform bills.134 
None of the five even comes close to forbidding condemnations 
for economic development. Four of the five laws create minor 
new procedural hurdles for local governments seeking to con-
demn property.135 As eminent domain scholar and litigator Ti-
mothy Sandefur has shown in a detailed analysis, none of the 
laws impose restrictions that will significantly impede the ex-
ercise of eminent domain in California.136  
Senate Bill 1206 attempts to narrow the definition of 
blight, but still leaves it broad enough to permit the condemna-
tion of almost any property that local governments might want 
to take for economic development purposes. The bill requires 
that a blighted area have both at least one “physical condition” 
that causes blight and one “economic” condition.137 Both lists of 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. The analysis of the Delaware, Ohio, and Texas laws is in large part 
derived from Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 245–52. 
 134. See S.53, 1206, 1210, 1650, 1809, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006). 
 135. See S.53, 1210, 1650, 1809, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006). 
 136. See Timothy Sandefur, PLF on Eminent Domain, Gov. Schwarzeneg-
ger Signs Mealy-Mouthed Property Rights Protection, Sept. 29, 2006, 
http://eminentdomain.typepad.com/my_weblog/2006/09/gov_schwarzeneg 
.html. 
 137. S.1206 § 2(b)(2) (requiring that blighted areas meet physical and eco-
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qualifying conditions include vague criteria that could apply to 
almost any neighborhood. The list of “physical conditions” in-
cludes “conditions that prevent or substantially hinder the via-
ble use or capacity of buildings or lots,” and “[a]djacent or near-
by incompatible land uses that prevent the development of 
those parcels or other portions of the project area.”138 Since “vi-
able use” and “development” are left undefined, local officials 
will have broad discretion to designate areas as they see fit. 
The list of “economic conditions” is similar. Among other 
things, it includes “[d]epreciated or stagnant property values,” 
“[a]bnormally high business vacancies,” and “abnormally low 
lease rates.”139 Since almost any area occasionally experiences 
stagnation or decline in property values and a declining busi-
ness climate, this list too puts no meaningful restrictions on 
blight designations. Moreover, it is important to remember that 
a blight condemnation requires just one condition from each 
list, further increasing official discretion. 
   ii. Connecticut 
The new Connecticut law merely forbids the condemnation 
of property “for the primary purpose of increasing local tax rev-
enue.”140 This restriction does not prevent condemnations for 
either economic development or blight purposes. Connecticut 
law allows local governments to condemn property for both 
economic development purposes and to alleviate blight-like 
conditions.141 Even the goal of increasing tax revenue can still 
be pursued so long as it is part of a more general plan for local 
“redevelopment.”142 In practice, it is likely impossible to prove 
 
nomic conditions defined in section 3).  
 138. Id. § 3. 
 139. Id. 
 140.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193(b)(1) (2009). 
 141. See generally id. § 8-124 (allowing use of eminent domain by redeve-
lopment agencies); id. § 8-125(2) (stating that “redevelopment areas” can be 
declared in any “area within the state that is deteriorated, deteriorating, subs-
tandard or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the commu-
nity”). The concept of “deteriorating” area is defined extremely broadly. Id. § 8-
125(7) (providing a list of numerous conditions only one of which must be met 
for an area to qualify as “deteriorating.” Even this list is not exhaustive, since 
the statute says that possible conditions qualifying an area as “deteriorating” 
are “not limited” to those enumerated). See also Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (noting that Connecticut law permitted condemnation 
of the New London properties despite the fact that they were not “blighted” 
and only because they were located in the development area. 
 142. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-125 to -133 (2009) (outlining procedures for 
condemning property in “redevelopment areas”). 
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that a given property is being condemned primarily for the 
purpose of “increasing local tax revenue” as distinct from the 
goal of promoting economic development more generally. It is 
ironic that the state in which the Kelo case originated has 
enacted one of the nation’s weakest post-Kelo reform laws, one 
that would not have prevented the condemnations challenged 
by Susette Kelo and her fellow New London property owners. 
 iii. Delaware 
The Delaware bill is arguably the least effective of all the 
post-Kelo laws enacted so far.143 It does not restrict condemna-
tions for economic development at all. The statute requires 
merely that the power of eminent domain only be exercised for 
“the purposes of a recognized public use as described at least 6 
months in advance of the institution of condemnation proceed-
ings: (a) In a certified planning document; (b) At a public hear-
ing held specifically to address the acquisition; or (c) In a pub-
lished report of the acquiring agency.”144 This bill does little 
more than restate current constitutional law, which already re-
quires that condemnation be for a “recognized public use.”145 
Indeed, the Kelo majority notes that “‘purely private taking[s]’” 
are constitutionally forbidden.146 The real question, however, is 
what counts as a “recognized public use,” and this issue is in no 
way addressed by the new Delaware law. 
The requirement that the purpose of the condemnation be 
announced six months in advance provides a minor procedural 
protection for property owners, but one that can easily be cir-
cumvented simply by tucking away the required announcement 
in “a “published report of the acquiring agency.”147 
 
 143. Just as this article went to press, the Delaware state legislature 
enacted a new reform law that seems to provide much stronger protection for 
property owners against blight and economic development takings. See Del. 
Sen. Bill 7 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9501A) (signed into law Apr. 
9, 2009), available at http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS145.NSF/vwLegislation/ 
SB+7?Opendocument. Unfortunately time constraints make it impossible to 
analyze the new law here. 
 144. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9505(15) (Supp. 2008).  
 145. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472. 
 146. Id. at 477 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 241, 245 
(1984)). 
 147. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 39 § 9505(15). 
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 iv. Maryland 
Maryland’s new law does not forbid condemnations for ei-
ther economic development or blight. Instead, it merely re-
quires a condemnation to occur within four years of its authori-
zation.148 This restriction is unlikely to impede economic 
development takings. Not only is the four year period quite 
long, but reauthorization is likely to be easily obtained under 
the state’s extremely broad definition of “blighted” and “slum” 
areas, both of which are eligible for condemnation under Mary-
land law.149 
 v. Ohio 
The main shortcoming of the Ohio law is its temporary na-
ture. The new law mandated that: 
[U]ntil December 31, 2006, no public body shall use eminent domain 
to take . . . private property that is not within a blighted area, as de-
termined by the public body, when the primary purpose for the taking 
is economic development that will ultimately result in ownership of 
that property being vested in another private person.”150  
Even within the short period of its effect, the law probably 
only had a very limited impact. While it forbade condemnations 
where economic development was the “primary purpose,” noth-
ing prevented such takings if the community could cite some 
other objective to which the development objective was an ad-
junct or complement.151 Creative local governments could easily 
come up with such proposals. Furthermore, the Ohio law expli-
citly exempted blighted areas from its scope;152 the definition of 
blight under Ohio law is broad enough to cover almost any 
 
 148. See MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 12-105.1(a) (West 2007).  
 149. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 61. The Maryland Constitution allows the 
use of eminent domain in “slum or blighted areas” and defines these terms as 
follows:   
The term “slum area” shall mean any area where dwellings predomi-
nate which, by reason of depreciation, overcrowding, faulty arrange-
ment or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or any 
combination of these factors, are detrimental to the public safety, 
health or morals. The term “blighted area” shall mean an area in 
which a majority of buildings have declined in productivity by reason 
of obsolescence, depreciation or other causes to an extent they no 
longer justify fundamental repairs and adequate maintenance. 
 150. An Act to Establish a Moratorium on Eminent Domain, S.B. 167 § 2, 
Oh. Gen. Assem. (Oh. 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1426 (Lexis-
Nexis 2005 Bulletin #5)).  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
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area.153 Finally, given the temporary nature of the legislation, a 
local government could get around it simply by postponing a 
given condemnation project for a few months. 
The Ohio legislation also established a “Legislative Task 
Force to Study Eminent Domain and its Use and Application in 
the State.”154 However, the twenty-five member commission 
was largely dominated by pro-eminent domain interests. Four-
teen of the twenty-five members were required to be represent-
atives of groups that tend to be supportive of broad eminent 
domain power. Only four were required to be members of 
groups likely to support strict limits on condemnation authori-
ty, and seven represented groups with mixed incentives.155 As 
was perhaps to be expected, the Commission’s Final Report 
recommended only minor reforms in state law. For example, it 
recommended tightening the state’s broad definition of blight, 
but its proposed new definition is almost as broad as the old 
one.156 In July 2007, the Ohio state legislature enacted a new 
reform law that adopted the definition of blight recommended 
by the Commission.157 That definition, however, provides little 
if any new protection for property owners.158 
 vi. Texas 
Texas’ post-Kelo legislation is likely to be almost complete-
ly ineffectual because of its major loopholes. It forbids condem-
 
 153. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.26(E) (LexisNexis 2003) (defining 
blight to include deteriorating structures or where the site “substantially im-
pairs or arrests the sound growth of a county, retards the provision of housing 
accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace 
to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare”). 
 154.  An Act to Establish a Moratorium on Eminent Domain, S.B. 167 § 3, 
Oh. Gen. Assem. (Oh. 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1426 (Lexis-
Nexis 2005 Bulletin #5)).  
 155. For a detailed analysis of the Commission’s composition, see Somin, 
Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 249. 
 156. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY EMINENT DOMAIN 
12, Aug. 1, 2006 (on file with author). The new definition of blight advocated 
by the Commission would allow the designation of an area as “blighted” so 
long as it was characterized by any two of seventeen different conditions. Id. 
Attachment 2. Many of these are vaguely defined and could apply to almost 
any property. For example, one of the seventeen conditions is “[f ]aulty lot 
layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness.” Id. Others 
include “[e]xcessive dwelling unit density” (without defining what constitutes 
“excessive”), and “[a]ge and obsolescence” (also undefined). Id. Like the old de-
finition, the new one would still permit virtually any property to be designated 
as “blighted.” For the old definition, see supra note 153. 
 157. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.08, 303.26 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 158. See supra note 156. 
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nations if the taking: 
1) confers a private benefit on a particular private party through the 
use of the property; (2) is for a public use that is merely a pretext to 
confer a private benefit on a particular private party; or (3) is for eco-
nomic development purposes, unless the economic development is a 
secondary purpose resulting from municipal community development 
or municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affir-
mative harm on society from slum or blighted areas . . . .159  
Taken literally, the first criterion in the act might be used 
to forbid almost all condemnations, since even traditional pub-
lic uses often “confer a private benefit on a particular private 
party through the use of the property.”160 Presumably, howev-
er, this prohibition is intended merely to forbid condemnations 
that create such a private benefit without also serving a public 
use. Otherwise, the state legislature would not be able to pro-
tect “community development” and “urban renewal” takings, 
which surely confer “private benefits” for “particular” per-
sons.161 
The legislation’s ban on pretextual takings merely reite-
rates current law. Kelo itself states that government is 
“no[t] . . . allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a 
public purpose, when [the] actual purpose was to bestow a pri-
vate benefit.”162  
The ban on takings for economic development purposes is 
largely vitiated by exemption for condemnations where “eco-
nomic development is a secondary purpose resulting from mu-
nicipal community development.”163 Virtually any project that 
promotes economic development can also be plausibly characte-
rized as advancing “community development.” It is difficult to 
see how the two concepts can be meaningfully distinguished in 
real world situations. Indeed, Texas law defines “community 
development” to permit condemnation of any property that is 
“inappropriately developed from the standpoint of sound com-
munity development and growth.”164 It is surely reasonable to 
suppose that “sound community development and growth” in-
cludes economic “development and growth.”165  
 
 159. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b) (Vernon 2008). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005). 
 163. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (Vernons 2008). 
 164. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 373.005(b)(1)(A) (Vernons 2005). 
 165. Id. 
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The Texas legislation does contain two potentially effective 
elements. First, it eliminates judicial deference to governmen-
tal determinations that a challenged condemnation is for a legi-
timate public use.166 This shifts the burden of proof in public 
use cases to the condemning authority. Second, it seems to for-
bid private-to-private condemnations under statutes other than 
those allowing the use of eminent domain for blight alleviation 
and “community development.”167 However, as noted above, 
Texas’ definition of “community development” is so broad that 
it can be used to justify almost any condemnation even under a 
nondeferential approach to judicial review. Judges are unlikely 
to find that very many takings run afoul of the community de-
velopment statute’s authorization of condemnation of property 
that is “inappropriately developed from the standpoint of sound 
community development and growth.”168 This broad standard 
can also be used to defend a wide range of condemnations for 
various private development projects even without specific leg-
islative authorization other than the community development 
law itself. Ultimately, the potentially effective elements of the 
Texas law are swallowed up by the “community development” 
exception.169 
 vii. Washington 
The state of Washington’s recent eminent domain law170 is 
not a true response to Kelo. It does not even pretend to restrict 
economic development takings or cut back on the definition of 
public use in any other way. Instead, the new statute seems to 
be a response to a 2006 Washington Supreme Court decision 
which held that property owners are not entitled to personal 
notice of public meetings called to consider the necessity of in-
itiating eminent domain proceedings against them.171 Because 
 
 166. § 2206.001(e). 
 167. See id. § 2206.001(b)(3) (referencing other Texas laws allowing takings 
for community development or improving blighted areas). These statutes are 
listed as the only broad exceptions to the bill’s ban on takings “for economic 
development purposes.”  Id. § 2206.001(b). 
 168. § 373.005(b)(1)(A). 
 169. Sandefur is more optimistic about these two provisions, calling them 
“significant improvements.” Sandefur, supra note 14, at 734. He does not, 
however, consider the possibility that they can be circumvented by means of 
the “community development” exception. 
 170. See Act of Apr. 17, 2007, ch. 68, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 268 (codified 
in scattered sections of REV. CODE WASH. ch.8 (2007)). 
 171. See Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transp. Auth. v. Miller, 128 P.3d 588 
(Wash. 2006). The state’s Senate Committee on the Judiciary cited this deci-
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the new law was neither a response to Kelo nor an attempt to 
narrow the definition of public use, I do not classify it as a post-
Kelo reform. Changing this classification would not noticeably 
alter the quantitative data discussed in Part III,172 nor would it 
alter the overall conclusions of this Article. If the law were to 
be viewed as a post-Kelo reform, it would be classified as add-
ing little or nothing to the protections Washington property 
owners already enjoyed before Kelo. The state supreme court 
banned economic development takings in 1959,173 and Wash-
ington already had a narrow definition of blight.174 
2. Legislatively Enacted Laws that Provide Substantially 
Increased Protection for Property Owners 
Fourteen state legislatures have enacted laws that either 
abolish or significantly constrain economic development tak-
ings. The most sweeping of these laws are Florida’s and New 
Mexico’s, which not only abolish condemnations for economic 
development, but also ban all blight condemnations, even those 
that occur in areas that would meet a strict definition of the 
term.175 Florida and New Mexico therefore became the second 
and third states to abolish blight condemnations, following in 
the footsteps of Utah, which did so prior to Kelo.176 Unlike Utah 
 
sion as the reason for passing the new Washington law. See S. REPORT, Subs-
titute H.B. 1458, 60th Leg. (Wash. 2007), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/ 
pub/billinfo/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/1458-S.SBR.pdf. 
 172. If I classified Washington state as having passed either an effective or 
ineffective reform law, that would not alter the political ignorance findings 
discussed in Part III because there are too few Washington respondents in the 
sample to make a statistically significant difference. 
 173. See Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying 
condemnation of residential property so that an agency could “devote it to 
what it consider[ed] a higher and better economic use”). 
 174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.80A.010 (2008) (defining blight narrowly 
for purposes of condemnation). 
 175. See Act of May 11, 2006, ch. 2006–11, 2006 Fla. Laws 214 (codified in 
scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act of Apr. 3, 2007, 2007 N.M. Laws 3873, 
ch. 330 (codified in scattered sections of N.M. STAT.). The New Mexico bill does 
still permit the  condemnation of property that  is characterized by “obsolete or 
impractical planning and platting”  and “(a) was platted prior to 1971; (b) has 
remained vacant and unimproved; and (c) threatens the health, safety and 
welfare of persons or property due to erosion, flooding and inadequate drai-
nage.”  Act of Apr. 3, 2007, 2007 N.M. Laws 3873, ch. 330, § 3-18-10(B)(3) (co-
dified in scattered sections of N.M. STAT.). 
 176. See supra note 81. However, Utah partially rescinded its ban on blight 
condemnations in a more recent bill. See Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 379, 2007 
Utah Laws 2326 (codified in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C) 
(permitting blight condemnations if approved by a supermajority of property 
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and New Mexico, which made little use of economic develop-
ment and blight takings even before the enactment of their new 
laws,177 Florida has an extensive record of dubious economic 
development and blight condemnations.178 Due to its broad 
scope and enactment in a large state that previously made ex-
tensive use of private-to-private takings, the new Florida law is 
probably the most important post-Kelo legislative victory for 
property rights activists. 
South Dakota’s new law is only slightly less sweeping than 
Florida’s. It continues to permit blight condemnations, but does 
not allow any takings—including those in blighted areas—that 
“transfer property to any private person, nongovernmental ent-
ity, or other public-private business entity.”179 This forbids eco-
nomic development takings, and also greatly reduces the politi-
cal incentive to engage in blight condemnations, since local 
governments can no longer use such takings to transfer proper-
ty to politically influential interests.180 Kansas’s new law is 
similar to South Dakota’s insofar as it bans nearly all private-
to-private condemnations.181 It forbids condemnations “for the 
purpose of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring such prop-
erty to any private entity” except in cases where needed for 
public utilities or where there is defective title.182 Blight con-
demnations are limited to cases where the property in question 
is “unsafe for occupation by humans under the building 
codes.”183  
Eight state reform laws couple a ban on economic develop-
ment condemnations with restrictions on the definition of 
blight that, roughly speaking, restrict blight condemnations to 
 
owners in the affected area). 
 177. A report prepared by the Institute for Justice (IJ) does not list a single 
private-to-private condemnation in Utah during the entire five-year period 
from 1998 to 2002. BERLINER, supra note 66, at 196. The IJ Report concluded 
(two years before the enactment of the 2005 reform law) that “Utah has done 
fairly well in avoiding the use of eminent domain for private parties.” Id. New 
Mexico did not have any private-to-private condemnations during the 1998–
2002 period. Id. at 143. 
 178. Id. at 52–58. 
 179. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1(1) (Supp. 2008). 
 180. For arguments that this is a major problem with economic develop-
ment and blight condemnations, see Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 
190–205, 264–71. 
 181. See Act of May 18, 2006, ch. 192, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 1345, §§ 1–2 
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501a, 26-501b (Supp. 2008)). 
 182. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501a(b) (Supp. 2008). 
 183. Id. § 26-501b(e). 
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areas that fit the intuitive definition of the term. This formula 
was successfully used in the Alabama,184 Georgia,185 Idaho,186 
Indiana,187 Michigan,188 New Hampshire,189  Virginia,190 and 
 
 184. See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c) (2008) (limiting definition of  blight to  a 
relatively narrow range of situations, such as property that is “unfit for hu-
man habitation,” poses a public health risk, or has major tax delinquencies); 
id. § 11-47-170(b) (forbidding condemnations that “transfer” nonblighted prop-
erty to private parties). 
 185. See GEO. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1), (10) (Supp. 2008) (forbidding econom-
ic development takings, and defining blight to include primarily risks to 
health, the environment, and safety, while excluding “esthetic” considera-
tions). 
 186. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b) (Supp. 2008) (forbidding con-
demnations “[f ]or the purpose of promoting or effectuating economic develop-
ment” and for the acquisition of nonblighted property, and defining blight as a 
condition that poses physical risks to the occupants of a building, spreads dis-
ease or crime, or poses “an actual risk of harm” to public safety, health, mor-
als, or welfare). The burden of proof for showing that blight exists is on the 
government. See id. Nonetheless, there is some room for potential slippage in 
the Idaho law because of the possibility that property could be condemned 
merely for posing an “actual risk of harm” to public “morals” or “welfare,” con-
cepts that could be defined broadly enough to include most economic develop-
ment takings. Id. § 7-701A(2)(b)(ii). 
 187. See IND. CODE § 32-24-4.5-7 (Supp. 2008) (forbidding most private-to-
private condemnations and defining blight as an area that “constitutes a pub-
lic nuisance,” is unfit for habitation, does not meet the building code, is a fire 
hazard, or is “otherwise dangerous”). 
 188. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.23(1), (3), (8) (Supp. 2008) (banning con-
demnations for “general economic development” and limiting the definition of 
“blight” to property that is a “public nuisance,” an “attractive nuisance,” poses 
a threat to public safety, such as a fire hazard, or is abandoned). The law does 
have a potential loophole insofar as it permits the condemnation of property as 
“blighted” if it “is not maintained in accordance with applicable local housing 
or property maintenance codes or ordinances.” Id. § 213.23(8)(g). This could 
allow local governments to manipulate the content of local property codes in 
such a way as to make it impossible for all or most property owners to fully 
comply, thus potentially opening the door to sweeping condemnation authority 
for economic development purposes. My tentative judgment is that this loop-
hole is not broad enough to completely negate the impact of the new statute. 
 189. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205:3-b (Supp. 2008) (defining public use 
as “exclusively” limited to government ownership, public utilities and common 
carriers, and blight-like condemnations needed to “remove structures beyond 
repair, public nuisances, structures unfit for human habitation or use, and 
abandoned property when such structures or property constitute a menace to 
health and safety”). 
 190. See VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2008) (permitting condemnation of pri-
vate property only if “(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership, 
occupation, and enjoyment of property by the public or a public corporation; 
(ii) the property is taken for construction, maintenance, or operation of public 
facilities by public corporations or by private entities provided that there is a 
written agreement with a public corporation providing for use of the facility by 
the public; (iii) the property is taken for the creation or functioning of any pub-
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Wyoming191 statutes. In the case of Nevada, the new legislation 
was enacted only in the aftermath of a referendum initiative 
that would ban both economic development and blight condem-
nations entirely. 
Two state laws—Pennsylvania and Minnesota—forbid eco-
nomic development takings and restrict the definition of blight, 
but significantly undermine their effectiveness by exempting 
large parts of the state from the law’s coverage. The Pennsyl-
vania law forbids “the exercise by any condemnor of the power 
of eminent domain to take private property in order to use it for 
private commercial enterprise,”192 and imposes a restrictive de-
finition of blight.193 However, the scope of this provision is un-
dermined by the effective exclusion of Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh, as well as some other areas, from its coverage.194 These 
two cities, by far the state’s largest urban areas, are also the 
sites of many of the state’s most extensive private-to-private 
takings.195 Although the provision exempting the two cities is 
set to expire on December 31, 2012,196 it is possible that legisla-
 
lic service corporation, public service company, or railroad; (iv) the property is 
taken for the provision of any authorized utility service by a government utili-
ty corporation; (v) the property is taken for the elimination of blight provided 
that the property itself is a blighted property; or (vi) the property taken is in a 
redevelopment or conservation area and is abandoned or the acquisition is 
needed to clear title where one of the owners agrees to such acquisition or the 
acquisition is by agreement of all the owners”). The new law also narrows the 
definition of “blight” to include only “property that endangers the public health 
or safety in its condition at the time of the filing of the petition for condemna-
tion and is (i) a public nuisance or (ii) an individual commercial, industrial, or 
residential structure or improvement that is beyond repair or unfit for human 
occupancy or use.” Id. § 1-219.1(B). 
 191. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c) (2007) (“As used in and for purpos-
es of this section only, ‘public purpose’ means the possession, occupation and 
enjoyment of the land by a public entity. ‘Public purpose’ shall not include the 
taking of private property by a public entity for the purpose of transferring the 
property to another private individual or private entity except in the case of 
condemnation for the purpose of protecting the public health and safety. . . .”). 
Technically, this law seems to forbid blight condemnations. However, the pro-
vision permitting condemnations for the purpose of protecting “public health 
and safety” is functionally equivalent to allowing condemnation under an ex-
tremely narrow definition of blight. 
 192. 26 PA CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (Supp. 2008). 
 193. See id. § 205(b), (c). 
 194. See id. § 203(4) (excluding areas designated as blighted within  “a city 
of the first or second class,” which under law turns out to be Pittsburgh and 
Philadelphia). 
 195. See BERLINER, supra note 66, at 173, 179–81 (describing major con-
demnation projects in the two cities). 
 196. See § 203(4). 
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tors will be able to extend the deadline, once the public furor 
over Kelo has subsided. 
Minnesota’s 2006 law was similar. It too banned economic 
development takings and restricted the definition of blight,197 
while creating some major geographic exemptions. In this case, 
the exemptions included land located in some 2000 Tax Incre-
ment Financing Districts, including much of the territory of the 
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, where a high propor-
tion of the state’s condemnations take place.198 A survey by the 
pro-Kelo League of Minnesota Cities found that twenty-seven of 
the thirty-four Minnesota cities that had used private-to-
private takings for economic development purposes between 
1999 and 2005 are located in the Twin Cities area, which was 
exempt from the state’s 2006 post-Kelo reform law.199 Thus, the 
new law impacted only a small fraction of those cities that ac-
tually engage in the practices it sought to curb. Like Pennsyl-
vania’s exemptions, Minnesota’s were time-limited, scheduled 
to expire in five years.200 However, the Minnesota exemptions 
were superseded by a new law enacted in early 2009, just as 
this article went to press.201 
 
 197. See MINN. STAT. § 117.025 (2008) (defining “public use” to mean exclu-
sively direct public use, or mitigation of blight, or a public nuisance, and not 
“the public benefits of economic development,” and defining a “blighted area”  
as  an urban area where more than half of the buildings are “structurally 
substandard” in the sense of having two or more building code violations). 
 198. Id. § 117.011 (2008) (setting out exceptions for tax increment financ-
ing districts), repealed by MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (West 2009 Electronic Up-
date). 
 199. See LEAGUE OF MINNESOTA CITIES, RESEARCH ON CITIES’ USE OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (2005) (on file with author); see also Eric Willette, LMC 
Study Finds Cities Use Eminent Domain Judiciously, LEAGUE OF MINN. CI-
TIES BULLETIN, Nov. 30, 2005, at 1. The LMC study claims that these cities 
use eminent domain only rarely and judiciously. Id. However, it also notes 
that the thirty-four cities engaged in an average of twelve economic develop-
ment takings per year, many of them involving “multiple parcels” of land. Id. 
This yields a total of over 400 economic development takings per year in the 
state of Minnesota, a fairly large number for a state with a population of only 
5.1 million. See infra tbl.A3. If each of these takings impacted about twelve 
people (a conservative estimate in view of the fact that many involved multiple 
parcels), then about 5000 Minnesotans lose property to economic development 
takings per year, for a total of 35,000 during the seven year period studied by 
the LMC. Between 1999 and 2005, some seven tenths of a percent of the Min-
nesota population may have lost property or been displaced by economic de-
velopment condemnations. 
 200. See MINN. STAT. § 117.011 (2008). 
 201. See MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (West 2009 Electronic Update) (repealing 
exemptions in the 2006 law). 
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Even many of the fourteen state laws that do succeed in 
abolishing or curbing economic development takings have se-
rious limitations. As already noted,  the Pennsylvania law i se-
riously weakened by geographic exemptions that exclude the 
state’s largest urban areas. The reforms enacted by Alabama, 
Georgia, and South Dakota were adopted by states that had lit-
tle or no recent history of resorting to private-to-private con-
demnations;202 thus, they forbid practices in which their local 
governments rarely engaged. Overall, only seven states that 
had previously engaged in significant amounts of economic de-
velopment and blight condemnation adopted legislative post-
Kelo reform measures with real teeth. 
3. Reforms Enacted by Popular Referendum 
In sharp contrast to legislatively enacted post-Kelo re-
forms, those adopted by popular referendum are, on average, 
much stronger. In 2006, ten states adopted post-Kelo reforms 
by popular referendum.203 All ten passed by large margins 
ranging from 55% to 86% of the vote.204 Of these, at least six 
and possibly seven provided significantly stronger protection 
for property owners than was available under existing law. Two 
other states—Georgia and New Hampshire—passed initiatives 
that added little or nothing to post-Kelo reforms already 
enacted by the state legislature.205 Finally, South Carolina vot-
 
 202. See BERLINER, supra note 66, at 10–11 (noting that Alabama “has 
mostly refrained from abusing the power of eminent domain in recent years” 
and had only one documented private-to-private condemnation in 2002); id. at 
59 (noting that Georgia is “one of a handful of states with no reported in-
stances” of such condemnations between 1998 and 2002); id. at 189 (same as 
to South Dakota). 
 203. For a complete list and other details, see Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 2006 Ballot, Nov. 12, 2006, 
http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/prop_rights_06.htm (last visitedMay 17, 2009) 
[hereinafter NCSL]. 
 204. Id. Only two post-Kelo ballot initiatives were defeated—one in Idaho 
and one in California. Id. Both lost primarily because they were tied to contro-
versial measures limiting “regulatory takings.”  See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, 
The California Crack-up, LIBERTY, Feb. 2007, available at http://liberty 
unbound.com/archive/2007_02/sandefur-california.html (attributing the defeat 
of California’s Proposition 90 primarily to the shortcomings of the regulatory 
takings element of the proposal and strategic errors of its supporters). No 
stand-alone post-Kelo public-use referendum initiative was defeated anywhere 
in the country. See NCSL, supra note 203. 
 205. See Ga. Amendment 1 (enacted on Nov. 7, 2006 and amending GA. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2); N.H. Question 1 (enacted on Nov. 7, 2006 and amending 
N.H. CONST. art. 12-a). 
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ers adopted a largely ineffective reform law. 206 It is crucial to 
recognize that referenda initiated by citizen groups were far 
more likely to lead to effective laws than those enacted by state 
legislatures. Indeed, only one state—Louisiana—passed a legis-
lature-initiated referendum that provided significantly greater 
protection for property owners than that available under preex-
isting statutory law enacted through the ordinary legislative 
process.207  
Three states—Arizona,208 Louisiana,209 and Oregon210—
enacted referendum initiatives that essentially followed the 
standard formula of combining a ban on economic development 
takings with a restrictive definition of blight. Nevada and 
North Dakota’s initiatives went one step beyond this and 
amended their respective state constitutions to ban virtually all 
condemnations that transfer property to a private owner.211 
The Nevada law did not take effect until it was approved by the 
voters a second time in November 2008.212  
Florida’s referendum initiative could not add much in the 
way of substantive protections to the state’s legislatively 
 
 206. S.C. Amendment 5 (amending S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13). 
 207. La. Amendment 5 (amending LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B), art. VI, § 21(A) 
and adding art. VI, § 21(D)). 
 208. See Ariz. Proposition 207 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (codified at ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1131 to -1138) (forbidding condemnations for “economic de-
velopment” and limiting blight-like condemnations to cases where there is “a 
direct threat to public health or safety caused by the property in its current 
condition”). 
 209. La. Amendment 5 (enacted Sept. 30, 2006) (amending LA. CONST. art. 
I, § 4(B), art. VI, § 21(A) and adding art. VI, § 21(D)) (forbidding condemna-
tions for “economic development” and tax revenue purposes, and confining 
blight condemnations to cases where there is a threat to public health or safe-
ty). 
 210. Or. Measure 39 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 35.015) (forbidding most private-to-private condemnations and limiting 
blight-like condemnations to cases where they are needed to eliminate dangers 
to public health or safety). 
 211. See Nev. Ballot Question 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006, reenacted on Nov. 4 
2008) (amending NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22) (forbidding the “direct or indirect 
transfer of any interest in property taken in an eminent domain proceeding 
from one private party to another private party”); N.D. Measure 2 (amending 
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16) (mandating that “public use or a public purpose does 
not include public benefits of economic development, including an increase in 
tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health. Private prop-
erty shall not be taken for the use of, or ownership by, any private individual 
or entity, unless that property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or 
utility business”). 
 212. See Nev. Ballot Question 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006, reenacted on Nov. 4, 
2008) (amending NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22). 
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enacted post-Kelo law, already the strongest in the country.213 
However, Constitutional Amendment 8 did alter the state con-
stitution to provide an important procedural protection: no new 
law allowing “the transfer of private property taken by eminent 
domain to a natural person or private entity” can be passed 
without a three-fifths supermajority in the state legislature.214 
This could be an important safeguard for property owners 
against the erosion of public use protections by future state leg-
islatures, after public attention has shifted away from eminent 
domain issues. 
Georgia’s new law adds little to that state’s strong legisla-
tively enacted post-Kelo statute, requiring only that any new 
private-to-private takings be approved by local elected offi-
cials.215 New Hampshire’s referendum initiative also comes in 
the wake of a strong legislative proposal and adds nothing to 
it.216 Indeed, absent the earlier legislation, it would provide no 
real protection at all, since it only forbids condemnations “for 
the purpose of private development or other private use of the 
property.”217 This wording is largely useless because it does not 
foreclose the argument that the transfer of property to a pri-
vate party will promote “public development” that benefits the 
community as a whole, not just private individuals.218  
South Carolina’s referendum seems to forbid takings for 
economic development. However, the wording may actually 
permit such takings, since it states that “[p]rivate property 
must not be condemned by eminent domain for any purpose or 
benefit, including, but not limited to, the purpose or benefit of 
economic development, unless the condemnation is for public 
use.”219 This, however, leaves open the question of whether 
economic development is in fact a public use—the very issue 
addressed by Kelo with respect to the Federal Constitution. 
Current South Carolina case law already holds that economic 
 
 213. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 214. Fla. Amendment 8 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending FLA. CONST. art. 
X, § 6). 
 215. Ga. Amendment 1 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending GA. CONST. art. 
IX, § 2). 
 216. N.H. Question 1 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending N.H. CONST. art. 
12-a).  
 217. Id.  
 218. See the discussion of the similar flaw in the wording of President 
Bush’s 2006 executive order on Kelo in infra Part II.B.3. 
 219. S.C. Amendment 5 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending S.C. CONST. art. 
I, § 13(A)). 
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development is not a public use under the state constitution.220 
The new constitutional amendment adds nothing to this the 
case law and leaves open the possibility that future court deci-
sions will be able to reverse it in the absence of a clear textual 
statement in the state constitution to the contrary. The South 
Carolina amendment also narrows the definition of blight to 
“property constituting a danger to the safety and health of the 
community by reason of lack of ventilation, light, and sanitary 
facilities, dilapidation, deleterious land use, or any combination 
of these factors.”221 However, this provision also has a potential 
loophole, since “deleterious land use” and “health of the com-
munity” could both be interpreted broadly to include the com-
munity’s “economic health” and “deleterious” land uses that 
undermine it. At best, the amendment modestly increases the 
protection provided by current law. 
The state of California enacted an ineffective referendum 
initiative, Proposition 99, in June 2008.222 This initiative was 
put on the ballot by the California League of Cities and other 
pro-condemnation groups for the purpose of forestalling the 
more restrictive Proposition 98 (sponsored by property rights 
advocates).223 Proposition 99 protects only owner-occupied resi-
dences against condemnations with the purpose of transferring 
property to “private persons” if the owner has lived in the home 
for at least one year.224 Renters, who make up 42% of California 
households, are left unprotected.225 The same is true of busi-
nesses and homeowners who have lived in their residences for 
less than one year.226 
 
 220. See Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 
1978) (striking down taking justified only by economic development). 
 221. S.C. Amendment 5 (amending S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13(B)).  
 222. See Cal. Proposition 99 (enacted June 3, 2008) (amending CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 19). 
 223. See Ilya Somin, Prop. 99’s False Promise of Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 
19, 2008, at A15. Proposition 99 includes a provision that would negate any 
conflicting eminent domain reform passed the same day, so long as Proposition 
99 got more votes than its competitor. Cal. Proposition 99, § 9 (enacted on 
June 3, 2008). See also Samantha Young, Voters Reject Prop. 98, Endorse Prop. 
99, LONG BEACH  PRESS-TELEGRAM, June 4, 2008 (noting that the California 
League of Cities placed Proposition 99 on the ballot and spent eleven million 
dollars on promoting it and working to defeat Proposition 98). 
 224. See Cal. Proposition 99 § 2, (enacted June 3, 2008) (amending CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 19(b), (e)(3)) (exempting from protection owner-occupied resi-
dences where the owner has resided for less than one year). 
 225. Somin, supra note 223. 
 226. See id. 
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Even the new protection for homeowners is likely to be in-
effective, because the measure allows the condemnation of 
owner-occupied homes if they are “incidental” to a “public work 
or improvement” project.227 This means that homes could still 
be taken for transfer to private developers if the proposed 
project allocated some space for a “public” facility such as a 
community center or library. Proposition 99 also allows gov-
ernment officials to claim that their true purpose is promoting 
economic or community development rather than conveyance of 
the property to a private person, which is only a means to an 
end. This, of course, is precisely the argument accepted by the 
Supreme Court in Kelo, when it held that the transfer of the 
condemned property to a private party was constitutionally 
permissible because it was undertaken for the “public purpose” 
of promoting development;228 Kelo already forbids “pretextual” 
takings adopted for the sole purpose of benefiting a private par-
ty,229 a protection that is likely to be ineffectual because con-
demning authorities can virtually always claim that they in-
tended to benefit the general public as well.230 In sum, 
Proposition 99 only applies to a subset of properties. And even 
with respect to them, it gives owners little protection beyond 
that already afforded by Kelo itself. 
The new Michigan amendment is an ambiguous case. The 
amendment forbids condemnation of property “for transfer to a 
private entity for the purpose of economic development or en-
hancement of tax revenues.”231 However, it did not change the 
state’s previously broad definition of “blight.” At this time, it is 
 
 227. See Cal. Proposition 99 (enacted June 3, 2008) (amending CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 19(e)(5)) (exempting takings of homes that are “incidental” to a variety 
of “public work[s] or improvement[s]”). The text of this section reads: 
“Public work or improvement” means facilities or infrastructure for 
the delivery of public services such as education, police, fire protec-
tion, parks, recreation, emergency medical, public health, libraries, 
flood protection, streets or highways, public transit, railroad, airports 
and seaports; utility, common carrier or other similar projects such as 
energy-related, communication-related, water-related and wastewa-
ter-related facilities or infrastructure; projects identified by a State or 
local government for recovery from natural disasters; and private 
uses incidental to, or necessary for, the public work or improvement. 
 228. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478–85 (2005). 
 229. Id. at 478 (stating that the “mere pretext” of a public benefit is not 
enough to justify a taking if the “actual purpose was to bestow a private bene-
fit”). 
 230. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 235–40. 
 231. Mich. Ballot Proposal 06-04 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending MICH. 
CONST. art. X, § 2). 
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not clear whether or not the landmark 2004 state supreme 
court decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock will be inter-
preted to constrain condemnation of property under very broad 
blight designations.232 If Hathcock is held to limit broad blight 
designations, then the new constitutional amendment would 
have the modest but real advantage of providing explicit tex-
tual foundations for Hathcock’s holding and reducing the 
chance of its reversal or erosion by future courts. If, on the oth-
er hand, Hathcock is interpreted to permit broad definitions of 
blight, then the Michigan referendum initiative will be largely 
ineffective in its own right. At this point, however, the status of 
the Michigan referendum initiative is largely moot because 
Michigan’s legislative reform has already narrowed the defini-
tion of blight.233 Thus, the Michigan constitutional amendment 
enacted by referendum reinforces the accomplishments of the 
previous statutory reform, but might not have been effective as 
a standalone law. 
In analyzing the post-Kelo referendum initiatives, it is im-
portant to note that four of the six clearly effective laws were 
enacted by means of initiative processes that allow activists to 
place a measure on the ballot without prior approval by the 
state legislature.234 One of the other two (Florida) was sent to 
the voters by a legislature that had already enacted the na-
tion’s strongest post-Kelo reform law; only the Louisiana state 
legislature forwarded to the voters a referendum initiative 
without first enacting a strong legislative reform of its own.235 
By contrast, all three largely ineffective initiatives required 
preapproval by state legislatures,236 and the same was true of 
the ambiguous Michigan case.237 The contrast is not so much 
between legislative reform and referendum initiatives, but be-
tween referenda enacted without the need for approval by the 
state legislature and every other type of reform that does in-
volve state legislators. 
 
 232. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–86 (Mich. 
2004). The status of blight condemnations under Hathcock is analyzed in So-
min, supra note 78. 
 233. See supra note 188. 
 234. The four are Arizona, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon. See NCSL, 
supra note 203. 
 235. See NCSL, supra note 203.  
 236. The three were Georgia, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. Id. 
 237. Id. 
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B. FEDERAL LAW 
1. The Private Property Rights Protection Act 
On November 3, 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005 
(“PRPA”) by an overwhelming 376 to 38 margin.238 Since early 
2006, the PRPA has been bottled up in the Senate239 and the 
109th Congress ended without the Act being passed into law. In 
May 2007, under the new Democratic Congress, the Act passed 
the Agriculture Committee of the House of Representatives; 
however, as of November 2008, it has not yet been voted on by 
the full House.240 To date, there is no indication as to whether 
the PRPA will be taken up by the new administration and Con-
gress that were elected in November 2008. Despite its failure to 
achieve passage so far, I consider it here because it is arguably 
the most important federal effort to provide increased protec-
tion for property owners in the aftermath of Kelo. 
The Act would block state and local governments from “ex-
ercis[ing] [their] power of eminent domain, or allow[ing] the ex-
ercise of such power by any person or entity to which such pow-
er has been delegated, over property to be used for economic 
development or over property that is subsequently used for 
economic development, if that State or political subdivision 
receives Federal economic development funds during any fiscal 
year in which it does so.”241 Violators are punished by the loss 
of all “[f]ederal economic development funds for a period of two 
fiscal years.”242 Condemnation for economic development is 
broadly defined to include any taking that transfers property 
“from one private person or entity to another private person or 
entity for commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to in-
 
 238. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted). 
 239. See Scott Bullock, The Specter of Condemnation, WALL ST. J., June 24, 
2006 (explaining how the PRPA was held up by Senator Arlen Specter, then 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 240. The PRPA has been renamed as the “Strengthening the Ownership of 
Private Property Act of 2007.” Text available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ 
gpoxmlc110/h926_ih.xml (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). On June 5, 2007, the leg-
islation was referred to the House Subcommittee on Healthy Families and 
Communities. No further action has been taken as of this writing. See LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS–THOMAS, H.R. 926, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d110:HR00926:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). 
 241. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005). 
 242. Id. § 2(b). 
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crease tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general economic 
health.”243  
 Tthe House bill might appear to create significant incen-
tives to deter state and local governments from pursuing eco-
nomic development takings. But any such appearance is decep-
tive because of the small amount of federal funds that offending 
state and local governments stand to lose. 
States and localities that run afoul of the PRPA would risk 
losing only “federal economic development funds,”244 defined as 
“any Federal funds distributed to or through States or political 
subdivisions of States under Federal laws designed to improve 
or increase the size of economies of States or political subdivi-
sions of States.”245 The precise definition of “economic develop-
ment funds” remains unclear, as it is difficult to tell precisely 
which federal programs are “designed to improve or increase 
the size of the economies of States or political subdivisions of 
States.”246 A Congressional Research Service analysis con-
cluded that the PRPA ultimately would delegate the task of 
identifying the relevant programs to the Attorney General.247 It 
is hard to say whether the incoming Obama Administration 
would be willing to antagonize state and local governments by 
defining “economic development funds” broadly. 
For present purposes, I count any grants to state and local 
governments that are designated as “development” programs in 
the federal budget. The 2005 federal budget defined only about 
13.9 billion dollars of the annual total of the estimated 416.5 
billion dollars in federal grants to states as designated for pur-
 
 243. Id. § 8(1). The Act goes on to establish several exemptions, but these 
are relatively narrow. See id. § 8(1)(A)–(G) (exempting condemnations that 
transfer property to public ownership and several other traditional public 
uses). 
 244. Id. § 2(b). 
 245. Id. § 8(2). 
 246. Id. 
 247. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONDEMNATION OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL COMMENTS ON THE HOUSE-
PASSED BILL (H.R. 4128) AND BOND AMENDMENT 4 (2005). The report bases 
this conclusion on section 5(a)(2) of the PRPA, which requires the Attorney 
General to compile a list of economic development grants, but does not expli-
citly state that the list should be used as a guide for determining which funds 
to cut off in the event of PRPA violations. Id. at 4 & n.7 (citing H.R. 4128, 
109th Cong. § 5(a)(2) (2005)). Section 11 of the Act does require that the Act 
“be construed in favor of a broad protection of private property rights.” H.R. 
4128, § 11. However, it is unclear whether this requirement will bind the At-
torney General in his determination of the range of programs covered by the 
Act’s funding cutoff. 
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poses of “community and regional development.”248 This 
amount includes 3.5 billion dollars “for homeland security,” 
“Departmental Management,” and over 3 billion dollars for 
“Emergency Preparedness and Response”249— funds that are 
unlikely to be categorized as economic development grants. 
Thus, it would seem that PRPA applies at most to just 7.4 bil-
lion dollars in federal grants to state and local governments, a 
mere 1.8% of all federal grants to states and localities.  
In some areas, of course, economic development grants 
might constitute an atypically large share of the local budget, 
so there are likely to be some parts of the country where PRPA 
has real bite. However, this effect is likely to be diminished by 
the ease with which offending localities can escape the sanction 
of loss of funding. State or local authorities that run afoul of 
PRPA can avoid all loss of federal funds so long as they “re-
turn[] . . .all real property the taking of which was found by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to have constituted a violation of 
[the act]” and replace or repair property damaged or destroyed 
“as a result of such violation.”250 Condemning authorities thus 
have an incentive to roll the dice on economic development tak-
ings projects in the hope that defendants will not contest the 
condemnation or will fail to raise the PRPA as a defense.251 At 
worst, the offending government can simply give up the project, 
leaving itself and whatever private interests it sought to bene-
fit not much worse off than they were to begin with. So long as 
it returns the condemned property, any such government 
stands to lose only the time and effort expended in litigation 
and the funds necessary to repair or pay for any property that 
has been damaged or destroyed. 
While the PRPA may have some beneficial effects in deter-
ring economic development condemnations in communities 
with an unusually high level of dependence on federal economic 
development funds, its impact if enacted is likely to be quite 
limited. 
 
 248. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 125 tbl.8-4, 126, 130 
(F.Y. 2005) (estimated figures for the 2005 fiscal year).  
 249. Id. at 125 tbl.8-4. 
 250. H.R. 4128, § 2(c). 
 251. This may not be an unlikely occurrence, given that many property 
owners targeted for condemnation are likely to be poor and legally unsophisti-
cated. Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 254 n.373. 
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2. The Bond Amendment 
The Bond Amendment was enacted on November 30, 2005, 
as an amendment to the 2006 appropriation bill for the Trans-
portation, Treasury,  and Housing and Urban Development de-
partments, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and various 
independent agencies.252 It forbids the use of funds allocated in 
the Act to “support” the use of eminent domain for “economic 
development that primarily benefits private entities.”253 
For three interrelated reasons, the Bond Amendment is 
likely to have little impact on the use of eminent domain by 
state and local governments. First, the Amendment forbids on-
ly those economic development takings that “primarily bene-
fit . . . private entities.”254 This restriction makes it possible for 
the condemning jurisdiction to argue that the primary benefit 
of the development will go to the public. Under Kelo’s extremely 
lenient standards for evaluating government claims that tak-
ings create public benefits,255 it is unlikely that such an argu-
ment will often fail in federal court. 
Second, the Bond Amendment completely exempts con-
demnations for: 
mass transit, railroad, airport, seaport, or highway projects as well as 
utility projects which benefit or serve the general public . . . other 
structures designated for use by the general public or which have oth-
er common-carrier or public-utility functions that serve the general 
public and are subject to regulation and oversight by the government, 
and projects for the removal of an immediate threat to public health 
and safety . . . or brownfield[s].256  
While many of these exceptions are unproblematic because 
they fall within the traditional public use categories of facilities 
owned by the government or available for use by the general 
public as a matter of legal right, the listing of “utility projects 
which benefit . . . the general public”257 might open up the door 
to at least some private economic development projects. 
 
 252. Act of Nov. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 2494–
95 (2005). 
 253. Id. at 2495. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (stating that 
courts should not “second-guess [a] City’s considered judgments about the effi-
cacy of its development plan”). 
 256. § 726, 119 Stat. at 2495, reprinted in MELTZ, supra note 247, at 12 
(replacing the language “an immediate threat to public health and safety” with 
“blight”). 
 257. Id. 
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Finally, the Bond Amendment’s impact is likely to be small 
because very few projects that do not fall within one of its many 
exceptions are likely to be funded by federal transportation and 
housing grants in any event. The law completely excludes from 
coverage “mass transit” and “highway projects.”258 There are 
few if any eminent domain projects previously funded by feder-
al transportation or housing grants that the bill actually for-
bids. 
3. President Bush’s June 23, 2006 Executive Order 
On June 23, 2006, the one year anniversary of the Kelo de-
cision, President George W. Bush issued an executive order 
that purported to bar federal involvement in Kelo-style tak-
ings.259 On the surface, the order seems to forbid federal agen-
cies from undertaking economic development condemnations, 
but its wording undercuts this goal. The key part of the order 
reads: 
It is the policy of the United States to protect the rights of Americans 
to their private property, including by limiting the taking of private 
property by the Federal Government to situations in which the taking 
is for public use, with just compensation, and for the purpose of bene-
fiting the general public and not merely for the purpose of advancing 
the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership or use 
of the property taken.260 
Read carefully, the order does not in fact bar condemna-
tions that transfer property to other private parties for econom-
ic development. Instead, it permits them to continue so long as 
they are “for the purpose of benefiting the general public and 
not merely for the purpose of advancing the economic interest 
of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property 
taken.”261  
Unfortunately, this language validates virtually any eco-
nomic development condemnation that the federal government 
might want to pursue. Officials can (and do) always claim that 
the goal of a taking is to benefit “the general public” and not 
“merely” the new owners.262 This is not a new pattern, but one 
that bedeviled takings litigation before Kelo; indeed, the New 
London authorities made such claims in Kelo itself and they 
were accepted by all nine Supreme Court Justices, including 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973 (June 23, 2006). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 246. 
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the four dissenters,263 as well as by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court264 (including its three dissenters).265 The Justices 
reached this conclusion despite considerable evidence that the 
takings were instigated by the Pfizer Corporation, which at the 
time hoped to benefit from them.266 Nonetheless, the courts ac-
cepted New London’s claims that its officials acted in good 
faith, since they could have intended to benefit the public as 
well as Pfizer.267  
Even had President Bush’s order been worded more strong-
ly, its impact would have been limited. The vast majority of 
economic development condemnations are undertaken by state 
and local governments, not by federal agencies. Nonetheless, it 
is noteworthy that the Bush administration apparently chose to 
issue an executive order that is almost certain to have no effect 
even in the rare instances where the federal government does 
involve itself in Kelo-like takings. 
III.  EXPLAINING THE PATTERN   
Why, in the face of the massive public backlash against Ke-
lo, has there been so much ineffective legislation? At this early 
date, it is difficult to provide a definitive answer. However, I 
would tentatively suggest that the weakness of much post-Kelo 
legislation is in large part due to widespread public ignorance. 
Survey data produced for this Article show that the overwhelm-
ing majority of citizens know little or nothing about post-Kelo 
reform laws in their states.268 This widespread ignorance may 
well account for the ineffectiveness of many of the new laws. It 
also helps account for several other aspects of the Kelo back-
lash, including its timing and the greater effectiveness of laws 
enacted by referenda relative to those adopted through the leg-
islative process.269 The political ignorance hypothesis accounts 
for the pattern of reform laws better than the leading alterna-
 
 263. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–85 (2005); id. 
at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 264. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 535 (Conn. 2004), aff ’d, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005). 
 265. Id. at 595–96. 
 266. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473–75. 
 267. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 235–40. 
 268. See infra tbl.6. 
 269. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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tive theory, which holds that the relative paucity of effective 
reform laws is the result of interest group lobbying.270 
A. PUBLIC IGNORANCE AND POST-KELO REFORM LAWS: THE 
SAINT INDEX SURVEY DATA 
As noted earlier, the majority of voters are “rationally ig-
norant” about most aspects of public policy because there is so 
little chance that an increase in any one voter’s knowledge 
would have a significant impact on policy outcomes. 271 No mat-
ter how knowledgeable a voter becomes, the chance that his or 
her better-informed vote will actually swing an electoral out-
come is infinitesimally small. There is, therefore, very little in-
centive for most citizens to acquire information about politics 
and public policy, at least so long as their only reason to do so is 
to become better-informed voters.272  
Recent survey data compiled at my request by the Saint 
Consulting Group, a firm that sponsors surveys on land use 
policy, confirm the hypothesis that most Americans have little 
or no knowledge of post-Kelo reform. The data compiled in Ta-
ble 6are based on an August 2007 Saint Index national survey. 
273  Because the state of Rhode Island enacted its post-Kelo law 
in 2008, it is coded as not having passed any law for purposes of 
my analysis of the Saint Index data, which was collected in Au-
gust 2007. Dropping Rhode Island respondents from the analy-
sis has no statistically significant impact on the results. 
The Saint Index results demonstrate that political ignor-
ance about post-Kelo reform is widespread. Only 13% of res-
pondents could both correctly answer whether or not their 
states had enacted eminent domain reform laws between 2005 
and the date of the survey, and correctly answer a follow-up 
question about whether or not those laws were likely to be ef-
fective in preventing condemnations for economic develop-
ment.274 Only 21% could even correctly answer the first ques-
 
 270. See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 14, at 769–72 (arguing that interest-
group opposition accounts for the failures of the Kelo backlash). 
 271. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 272. For a more detailed discussion of the theory of rational ignorance, see 
Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Politi-
cal Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255 (2006) (symposium on political know-
ledge); Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 20. 
 273. See infra tbl.6. 
 274. For the exact wording of the two questions involved, see infra app. B. 
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tion in the sequence: whether or not their state had enacted 
eminent domain reform since Kelo was decided in 2005.275  
It is also important to recognize that 6% of respondents be-
lieved that their states had enacted post-Kelo reforms that 
were likely to be “effective” in reducing economic development 
takings even though the state in fact had not. This is not a 
large number in absolute terms, but it still represents more 
than one-third of the 17% of respondents who expressed any 
opinion at all about the effectiveness of their state’s reforms.276 
An additional 2% wrongly believed that their states’ reform 
laws were ineffective even though the opposite was in fact true. 
Even among the small minority of Americans who paid close 
enough attention to post-Kelo reform legislation to have an opi-
nion about its effectiveness, there was a high degree of ignor-
ance.277 
Table 6 indicates that ignorance about state post-Kelo 
reform cuts across gender, racial, and political lines. Some 85% 
of men and 90% of women were ignorant about the condition of 
post-Kelo reform, as were 82% of African-Americans, 89% of 
whites, and similar overwhelming majorities of liberals and 
conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, and other groups. It 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that most Americans are ig-
norant about the existence or lack thereof of post-Kelo reform 
in their states, and even fewer can tell whether the reform was 
effective or not.  
The Saint Index data may even understate the amount of 
ignorance about post-Kelo reform. Some respondents may have 
gotten the right answers by guessing. In order to get a correct 
answer, respondents living in the eight states that have not 
passed any post-Kelo reform needed only to get one binary 
question and had a 50% chance of getting the right answer 
through random guessing; those living in the forty-two states 
that have passed reform laws needed to get two such questions 
correct, and thus had a 25% chance of doing so through random 
guessing.278 Past research shows that many survey respondents 
 
 275. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 9; see infra app. B (question 
wording). 
 276. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10; see infra app. B (question 
wording). 
 277. Only 17% of respondents expressed any opinion at all about the effec-
tiveness of post-Kelo reform in their states. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, 
qstn. 10. 
 278. Question 10 on the Saint Index survey has four possible answers in 
addition to “don’t know.” See infra app. B. However, as described in Appendix 
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will guess in order to avoid admitting ignorance about the sub-
ject matter of a poll question, and that may have happened in 
this case as well.279 An additional factor biasing the knowledge 
levels found in the Saint Index survey upwards is the fact that 
the pollsters only surveyed Americans over the age of 21. Polit-
ical knowledge is generally correlated with age,280 and young 
adults (people aged 18–29) have the highest incidence of ignor-
ance of any age group.281 The exclusion of 18–20 year olds from 
the sample reduces the representation of this group in the ag-
gregate data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B, in each case I coded two different answers as “correct” for purposes of Table 
6. Respondents living in states that had passed effective laws could get a “cor-
rect” answer by choosing either A or B, while those in states with ineffective 
reforms could pick either C or D. 
 279. For the classic survey result showing that many respondents will ex-
press opinions even about completely fictitious legislation invented by re-
searchers rather than admit ignorance, see Stanley Payne’s famous finding 
that 70% of respondents expressed opinions regarding the nonexistent “Metal-
lic Metals Act.” STANLEY PAYNE, THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 18 (1951). 
 280. See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS 
KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 157 (1996). But see Somin, Polit-
ical Ignorance, supra note 20, at 1327 (demonstrating only slight correlation 
between political knowledge and age when controlling for fifteen other va-
riables). 
 281. See MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, IS VOTING FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? 79–91 
(2007) (summarizing evidence indicating that the young have the lowest levels 
of political information of any age group). 
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Table 6: 
Public Knowledge of State Post-Kelo Reform282 
 Group % Unaware of the Condition 
of Post-Kelo Reform in their 
State 
 
Total 87 
Gender 
 
Male 85 
Female 90 
Racial/Ethnic283 
Group White 89 
African American 82 
Asian 75 
Hispanic/Latino 100 
Native American 75 
Party 
Affiliation 
Democrat 89 
Independent 83 
Republican 89 
Ideology Liberal 88 
Moderate 90 
Conservative 87 
 
The fact that most citizens are ignorant about post-Kelo 
reform  not surprising to researchers. Large majorities know 
 
 282. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstns. 9& 10; see infra app. B (ques-
tion wording). I counted as “correct” those respondents who both (1) knew 
whether or not their states had passed post-Kelo eminent domain reform laws, 
and (2) correctly answered the question about whether or not those laws were 
effective. Respondents from the eight states that had not enacted any post-
Kelo laws were counted as giving correct answers to both questions if they cor-
rectly answered the first question by stating that their states had not adopted 
any reforms. Totals have been rounded off to the nearest whole number. The 
State of Utah presented a difficult methodological dilemma because it had 
banned economic development takings prior to Kelo. In the results in Table 5, 
supra, it is coded as having “effective” reforms and respondents who gave that 
answer were credited with a “correct” response. Coding the Utah results the 
other way does not significantly alter the overall results because of the ex-
tremely low number of Utah respondents in the sample. 
 283. The results for Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans may be unre-
liable because they are based on very small sample sizes of twenty-four, 
twelve, and twelve respondents respectively. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
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little or nothing about far more important policies. For exam-
ple, polls conducted around the time of the 2004 election 
showed that 70% of Americans did not know that Congress had 
recently enacted a massive prescription drug bill, and 58% ad-
mitted that they knew little or nothing about the controversial 
USA Patriot Act.284 What may be somewhat surprising—
especially to nonexpert observers—is that public ignorance is so 
widespread despite the immense outcry that the issue has gen-
erated. 
B. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE SAINT INDEX 
DATA CONSISTENT WITH THE CLAIM THAT VOTERS WERE 
ADEQUATELY INFORMED 
There are several possible objections to my theory that the 
Saint Index data prove the existence of widespread ignorance 
about post-Kelo reform that undermines the ability of voters to 
force through the sorts of policies favored by overwhelming ma-
jorities. I consider four such potential objections here and ten-
tatively conclude that none of them withstand close scrutiny. 
1. The Possibility of Respondent Forgetting 
Because post-Kelo reforms were enacted over a two-year 
period between the time Kelo was decided in June 2005 and the 
time the Saint Index data was collected in August 2007, it is 
conceivable that voters were well-informed of the contents of 
their state’s legislation at the time but later forgot that know-
ledge. To test that hypothesis, I checked whether the respon-
dents from Connecticut, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Virginia, and Wyoming—the eight states whose 
post-Kelo laws were enacted in 2007—had greater knowledge 
than respondents in states where reform legislation passed in 
2005 and 2006.285 Two of these states—Nevada and Ohio—
passed their second post-Kelo reform laws during this time pe-
riod. The eight states in question all enacted eminent domain 
reform laws between February 28 and July 10, 2007,286 just a 
few months or weeks before the Saint Index survey was con-
ducted, from August 1 to August 10, 2007. The data show that 
 
 284. Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance 
Threatens Democracy, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 525, Sept. 22, 2004, 
at 6 tbl.1. 
 285. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
 286. See supra notes 91 (Montana), 94 (Ohio), 106 (Nevada), 142 (Connecti-
cut), 148 (Maryland), 175 (New Mexico), 190 (Virginia), 191 (Wyoming). 
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the 122 respondents from those eight states had almost exactly 
the same knowledge levels as those in the rest of the country.287 
Twenty-six percent of respondents in the eight 2007 states 
knew whether or not their states had passed post-Kelo reform 
laws, a figure only slightly higher than the 20% rate compiled 
by respondents from the other forty-two states.288 Similarly, 
12% of respondents in these eight states could correctly answer 
both the question about the existence of reform laws and the 
question about their effectiveness; the figure for the other forty 
four states was 13%.289 While some forgetting could have taken 
place even in the few weeks between the passage of the 2007 
laws and the time of the Saint Index survey, one would still ex-
pect that respondents in the eight states would be less likely to 
forget than those in states that had enacted their reforms earli-
er. The lack of any statistical differences between the two sets 
of respondents suggests that forgetting is not a major factor in 
accounting for the widespread ignorance revealed in the 2007 
Saint Index data. Other data also show that those voters who 
do acquire political knowledge tend to retain it for many 
years.290 
2. The “Issue Public” Hypothesis 
Public ignorance about post-Kelo reform might also be less 
bleak than the data suggests if those who cared about the issue 
strongly were mostly well-informed about it. This scenario 
would be consistent with the “issue public” hypothesis ad-
vanced by some political scientists, which holds that citizens 
are likely to be well-informed about a small number of issues 
that they care about intensely even if they remain ignorant 
about most others.291 However, survey data show that the per-
centage of the public who care intensely about eminent domain 
 
 287. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
 288. Id. qstn. 9. Standard tests showed that the difference between the 
26% and 20% figures is not statistically significant; the relevant data is avail-
able from the author. 
 289. Id. qstns. 9& 10. 
 290. See M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge Over Time and Across 
Generations, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 228, 243–45 (1996) (discussing relevant evi-
dence on retention of political knowledge); Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and 
Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY. L. 
REV. 595, 639–40 (2003) (same).  
 291. For a recent defense of the theory, see generally VINCENT L. HUTCH-
INGS, PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2003). For discus-
sion and criticism of this theory, see Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 20, at 
427–29.  
 2009] POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO 2161 
 
reform is much greater than the mere 13% who know enough 
about it to be able to determine whether their states have 
passed effective post-Kelo laws or not.292 As discussed in Part I, 
63% of respondents in a 2005 Saint Index survey said that they 
“strongly” opposed the Kelo decision.293 A 2006 Saint Index poll 
question showed that 43% “strongly” support reforms intended 
to ban economic development takings.294 Even the smaller of 
these two figures is still  more than three times greater than 
the percentage of respondents who knew whether or not their 
states had passed effective reforms as of the time of the August 
2007 Saint Index survey.295 
Political ignorance greatly reduces the number of voters 
who could potentially use the level of post-Kelo reform in their 
state as a basis for electoral decisions. In other words, it greatly 
diminishes the size of the potential “issue public.” Even if the 
13% who gave accurate answers on the survey all feel strongly 
about the issue and make effective use of that knowledge in de-
ciding which candidates to support in state and local elections, 
that still leaves several times that number of citizens who also 
feel strongly about banning economic development takings but 
lack the necessary knowledge to reward political leaders who 
support effective reform and punish those who oppose it. 
3. The “Miracle of Aggregation” 
A third potentially benign interpretation of widespread ig-
norance of post-Kelo reform is the “miracle of aggregation.”296 
Even if many or most voters are ignorant about a particular is-
sue, that may be irrelevant to political outcomes if their errors 
are randomly distributed. In that situation, ignorance-driven 
votes for candidate or policy A would be offset by a similar 
number of “mistaken” votes for alternative B, and electoral out-
comes would be determined by the (potentially very small) mi-
nority of well-informed citizens. With respect to post-Kelo 
reform, there are two serious problems with this scenario. 
 
 292. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
 293. See supra  Part I. 
 294. See 2006 SAINT INDEX, supra note 48; see also Somin, supra note 48, 
at 1940. 
 295. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
 296. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribu-
tion of Information, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369, 381–
83 (John A. Ferejohn & James Kuklinski eds., 1990) (describing the “miracle 
of aggregation” theory); see also DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMO-
CRATIC FAILURE (1995). 
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First, even random error is likely to have an important impact 
on policy. Second, the errors are not in fact randomly distri-
buted, but are skewed toward overestimation of the effective-
ness of post-Kelo reform laws.297 
Even if errors really are randomly distributed, the exis-
tence of widespread ignorance still greatly diminishes the 
number of voters who can take account of post-Kelo reform in 
choosing candidates. It likely eliminates at least 70% of those 
voters who “strongly” support a ban on economic development 
takings.298 This greatly reduces the potential pressure on of-
ficeholders to comply with overwhelming popular sentiment. If, 
for example, 10% of the 43% of Americans who say they strong-
ly support effective post-Kelo reform would be willing to vote on 
the issue if they were informed about it, ignorance will have 
reduced the number willing to change their vote based on the 
issue from 4.3% of the adult population to a maximum of 
1.3%.299 And even that figure unrealistically assumes that the 
13% with accurate knowledge of post-Kelo reform in their 
states were all drawn from among the 43% who care “strongly” 
about banning economic development takings.  
It is also important to recognize that respondent mistakes 
about post-Kelo reform are not randomly distributed. It is far 
more common for voters to believe that their state has passed 
effective reform even if it has not than for them to believe that 
it has not done so in cases where it actually has. As discussed 
above,300 some 6% of the 2007 Saint Index survey respondents 
wrongly believed that their state passed effective reform, whe-
reas only 2% mistakenly believed that their state had failed to 
enact effective reform, even though it had. The 6% figure may 
not seem high in and of itself. But it constitutes more than one 
third of all those respondents (17%) who had any opinion on the 
effectiveness of post-Kelo reform in their states at all. Unfortu-
nately, it is impossible to use the 2007 Saint Index data to de-
termine whether these 17% were disproportionately drawn 
from the subset of respondents most interested in post-Kelo 
reform issues. However, it is plausible that they were. If so, it 
is possible that the 6% of respondents who mistakenly believed 
 
 297. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See 2006 SAINT INDEX, supra note 48 (43% figure). The 1.3% figure is 
calculated by taking 10% of the 13% who could correctly identify the status of 
post-Kelo reform in their state. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23. 
 300. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
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that their state has passed effective post-Kelo reform constitute 
a substantial percentage of those who would otherwise use the 
issue as a criterion for voting. Their ignorance deprived them of 
the opportunity to use their votes to reward politicians who 
support effective reform and punish those who oppose it. 
4. Opinion Leaders as Sources of Information 
Finally, it is possible that voters could learn about the ef-
fectiveness or lack thereof of post-Kelo laws by relying on the 
statements of interest groups and other “opinion leaders” who 
have incentives to be better informed than ordinary citizens.301 
However, as I have discussed at greater length elsewhere, re-
liance on opinion leaders itself requires considerable know-
ledge, including the knowledge needed to select opinion leaders 
to follow who appear to be both knowledgeable and trustwor-
thy. 302 Moreover, the ways in which the Kelo issue cuts across 
traditional party and ideological lines makes it more difficult 
for voters to identify opinion leaders to follow based on tradi-
tional political cues, such as partisan or ideological affilia-
tion.303 In addition, the failure of the opinion leader “informa-
tion shortcut” to alleviate ignorance on less complex and more 
important issues than post-Kelo reform304 suggests that it will 
be of only limited utility in this case. Most important of all, the 
widespread ignorance revealed in the Saint Index survey shows 
that most citizens either did not acquire relevant information 
from opinion leaders or obtained information that turned out to 
be misleading about the true effectiveness of reform laws in 
their states.305 
C. POLITICAL IGNORANCE AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE 
ANOMALIES OF THE BACKLASH 
The political ignorance hypothesis gains traction from the 
fact that it can account for three otherwise anomalous aspects 
 
 301. See, for example, ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE 
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 
206–08 (1998), for the argument that reliance on opinion leaders can alleviate 
the problem of political ignorance.  
 302. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Book Note, Resolving the Democratic Dilemma?, 
16 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 408–11 (1999). 
 303. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 301, at 206 (arguing that voters 
often choose opinion leaders based on common interest or trust). 
 304. See Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 20, at 424–26, for a more de-
tailed discussion. 
 305. See supra Part III.A. 
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of the Kelo controversy: the massive backlash against a decision 
that largely reaffirmed existing case law that had previously 
excited little public controversy; the paucity of effective reform 
measures despite widespread public opposition to economic de-
velopment takings; and the striking divergence between citi-
zen-initiated referendum initiatives and all other types of post-
Kelo reform measures. 
1. Explaining the Timing of the Kelo Backlash 
Some Kelo defenders complain that the backlash against 
the decision was excessive in light of the fact that the case 
made little change in existing law.306 After all, eminent domain 
was not a prominent national issue before Kelo, even though 
existing constitutional doctrine permitted economic develop-
ment takings under the Federal Constitution. A spokesman for 
California redevelopment agencies lamented that Kelo led to “a 
hue and cry about how bad things are in California, yet Kelo 
changed nothing.”307 But the reaction is understandable once 
we recognize that—for most people—Kelo was the first inkling 
they ever had that private property could be condemned merely 
to promote economic development by other private parties. This 
sudden realization led to outrage and a desire for change.308 
Public ignorance helps explain why economic development tak-
ings could become so common despite the fact that the vast ma-
jority of citizens oppose condemnation of private property for 
such purposes.309 It is likely that, prior to Kelo, most of the pub-
lic did not even realize that economic development condemna-
tions existed. The public ignorance hypothesis is arguably the 
only explanation for the suddenness of the Kelo backlash. It al-
so helps explain why there was relatively little public pressure 
to reform eminent domain law before Kelo. 
2. Explaining the Paucity of Effective Reform Laws 
Public ignorance is also the best available explanation for 
the seeming scarcity of effective post-Kelo reform laws. The 
 
 306. Cf. supra Part I.A–B (explaining how Kelo made little change in exist-
ing doctrine). 
 307. See Michael Gardner, Lawmakers Rethink Land-Seizure Laws, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 17, 2005, at A1 (quoting John Shirey’s statement 
about Kelo). 
 308. Cf. supra Part I.B (discussing public condemnation of the Kelo deci-
sion). 
 309. See infra Part I.B. 
 2009] POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO 2165 
 
highly publicized Supreme Court decision apparently increased 
awareness of eminent domain abuse, perhaps as a result of ex-
tensive press coverage. But while the publicity surrounding Ke-
lo made much of the public at least somewhat aware of the is-
sue of economic development takings, it probably did not lead 
voters to scrutinize the details of proposed reform legislation. 
The Saint Index survey showed that almost 80% of Americans 
do not even know whether their state has passed a reform law 
at all.310 
Few citizens have the time or inclination to delve into such 
matters and many are often ignorant of the very existence of 
even the most important legislative items.311 Thus, it would not 
be difficult for state legislators to seek to satisfy voter demands 
by supporting “position-taking” legislation that purported to 
curb eminent domain,312 while in reality having little effect. In 
this way, they can simultaneously cater to public outrage over 
Kelo and mollify developers and other interest groups that ben-
efit from economic development condemnations.  
This strategy seems to have been at the root of the failure 
of post-Kelo reform efforts in California. In that state, legisla-
tive reform efforts were initially sidetracked by the introduc-
tion of weak proposals that gave lawmakers “a chance . . . to 
side with the anti-eminent domain sentiment without doing 
any real damage to redevelopment agencies.”313 At a later stage 
in the political battle, the Democratic majority in the state leg-
islature tabled even these modest reforms by claiming that 
they were being blocked by the Republican minority, despite 
the fact that “the stalled bills required only simple majority 
votes and thus needed no Republicans to go along.”314 As one 
Sacramento reporter put it, the entire process may have been 
“just a feint to pretend to do something about eminent domain 
without actually doing anything to upset the apple cart.”315 
Eventually, California did enact some reforms, but only ones 
 
 310. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 9.  
 311. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 284, at 6 tbl.1 (providing survey data that 
the majority of citizens are unaware of basic facts of several of the most impor-
tant pieces of legislation adopted by Congress in the 2003–04 term). 
 312. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61–
73, 114–15, 121–25 (1974), for a discussion of the concept of position-taking 
legislation. 
 313. Dan Walters, Eminent Domain Bills Are Stalled–Except One for Casi-
no Tribe, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 16, 2005, at A3. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
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that are almost completely ineffective.316 A leading advocate for 
eminent domain reform in Nevada believes that, in his state as 
well, legislators sought to “look good while not upsetting any-
one.”317 
The California League of Cities (“CLC”), an organization 
composed of local governments with an interest in preserving 
their eminent domain authority, also sought to exploit political 
ignorance about post-Kelo reform. The CLC succeeded in plac-
ing an essentially meaningless eminent domain reform refe-
rendum initiative—Proposition 99—on the state’s 2008 ballot 
as a way of preempting a stronger referendum initiative spon-
sored by property rights advocates.318 As discussed above, 
Proposition 99 cleverly included a provision stating that it 
would supersede any other eminent domain referendum 
enacted on the same day, so long as the latter gotfewer votes 
than the CLC proposal.319 
Such maneuvers would be difficult to bring off if the public 
paid close attention to pending legislation, but they can be 
quite effective in the presence of widespread political ignor-
ance. Unfortunately, public ignorance of the details of eminent 
domain policy is unlikely to be easily remedied.  
3. Explaining the Relative Success of Citizen-Initiated 
Referendum Initiatives 
As we have already seen, there is a great difference be-
tween the effectiveness of citizen-initiated referendum initia-
tives and all other types of post-Kelo reforms. Four of the five 
citizen-initiated referenda passed since Kelo provide  strong 
protection for property owners against economic development 
takings.320 By contrast, only fourteen of thirty six state legisla-
tive initiatives are comparably effective, as are only two or 
three of six legislature-initiated referenda.321 Reforms initiated 
by Congress and the President at the federal level are also 
largely cosmetic in nature.322 
 
 316. See supra Part II.A.1.b.i. 
 317. Interview with Steven Miller, Vice President for Policy, Nev. Policy 
Research Inst. (Mar. 14, 2007) (on file with author). Nevada eventually passed 
effective eminent domain reform by referendum. See supra Part II.A.3; see also 
supra text accompanying note 115. 
 318. See discussion of Proposition 99 supra Part II.A.3. 
 319. See discussion of Proposition 99 supra Part II.A.3. 
 320. See supra tbl.3. 
 321. See supra tbl.3. 
 322. Cf. Part I.B (noting the widespread political opposition resulted in lit-
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The likely explanation for this striking pattern is consis-
tent with the political ignorance hypothesis. Citizen-initiated 
referendum proposals are usually drafted by activists rather 
than by elected officials and their staffs. This was the case with 
all four of the post-Kelo citizen-initiated referenda enacted in 
2006.323 Unlike state legislators, the property rights activists 
who wrote the citizen-initiated anti-Kelo ballot initiatives had 
no need to appease powerful pro-condemnation interest groups 
in order to improve reelection chances, and they also had little 
reason to promote reforms that fail to produce real changes in 
policy. Unlike ordinary citizens, committed activists in a posi-
tion to draft referendum proposals and get them on the ballot 
have strong incentives to acquire detailed information about 
eminent domain law; they have a real chance of influencing pol-
icy outcomes through their actions. Obviously, property rights 
activists can and do influence legislatively enacted reforms as 
well. However, in this scenario, anything they propose is likely 
to be filtered through the legislative process, where organized 
interest groups will inevitably have a significant say.  
California’s Proposition 99, the one citizen-initiated refe-
rendum measure that does not provide meaningful protection 
to property owners, is the exception that proves the rule. Prop-
osition 99 was not drafted by property rights activists, but ra-
ther by local governments and other interest groups seeking to 
protect broad eminent domain authority by forestalling a rival 
 
tle meaningful legislative reform). 
 323. The Arizona initiative was undertaken by an activist group known as 
the Arizona Home Owners’ Protection Effort. See Arizona Secretary of State, 
Proposition 207, available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/ 
PubPamphlet/english/Prop207.htm. The Nevada law was put on the ballot by 
the People’s Initiative to Stop the Taking of Our Land (“PISTOL”), along with 
other individuals. See Nevadans for the Protection of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Hel-
ler, 141 P.3d 1235, 1238–39 (Nev. 2006) (listing the respondents to the initia-
tive petition of “Nevada Property Owners’ Bill of Rights,” which sought to 
amend the Nevada Constitution with respect to eminent domain). In North 
Dakota, the ballot initiative was sponsored by a group known as Citizens to 
Restrict Eminent Domain) (C-RED). See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL-
ITICS, 2006 BALLOT MEASURE OVERVIEW 37, 48 (2007), available at http://www 
.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/5780/2007110512006BallotReport_
Overview.pdf?sequence-1 (demonstrating that C-RED raised all of the contri-
butions in support of Measure 2, which prohibits government takings of pri-
vate property for economic development). In Oregon, the post-Kelo initiative 
was filed by the Oregonians in Action Political Action Committee. See MEAS-
URE ARGUMENT FOR STATE VOTERS’ PAMPHLET FOR MEASURE 39 (on file with 
author). Oregonians in Action is a property rights activist group. See Orego-
nians in Action, Background Information, http://www.oia.org/index.php/about-
us (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). 
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ballot measure that would have provided stronger protection 
for property owners.324 Proposition 99 passed easily,  getting 
some 63% of the vote;325 although we do not have any definitive 
data, it is likely that California voters could not tell the differ-
ence between a referendum measure that provided meaningful 
new protection for property owners and one that did not. The 
sponsors of Proposition 99 achieved their goal of defeating the 
rival Proposition 98, though the defeat of the latter was at least 
in large part the result of its inclusion of a phase out of rent 
control.326  
The Proposition 99 experience supports my conjecture that 
citizen-initiated referenda provide effective protection because 
of the identity and purposes of their drafters. When the draf-
ters are property rights activists seeking to ban Kelo-style tak-
ings, citizen-initiated referenda result in strong limitations on 
eminent domain. When initiatives are drafted by pro-
condemnation interest groups such as the California League of 
Cities, they will most likely provide only cosmetic reforms. Ei-
ther way, rationally ignorant voters are likely to support them. 
D. INTEREST GROUP POWER AS AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
The most obvious alternative explanation for the scarcity of 
effective reform laws is the political power of developers and 
other organized interest groups that benefit from the transfer 
of property condemned as a result of economic development and 
blight condemnations.327 There is little question that this factor 
does play a role. Developers, local government planning offi-
cials, and other interest groups have indeed spearheaded oppo-
sition to post-Kelo reform.328 In Texas, for example, advocates 
of strong eminent domain reform concluded that lobbying by 
developers and local governments played a key role in ensuring 
that that state passed an essentially toothless reform law.329 
However, the interest group explanation has three crucial 
shortcomings relative to the political ignorance hypothesis. It 
 
 324. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 325. See Young, supra note 223.  
 326. See id. (noting role of rent-control phase out in stimulating opposition 
to Proposition 98). 
 327. See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 14, at 768–72 (arguing that interest-
group opposition and local government complicity accounts for the failures of 
the Kelo backlash). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Interview with Brooke Rollins, President & CEO, Tex. Pub. Policy 
Found. (Mar. 17, 2007) (on file with author). 
 2009] POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO 2169 
 
cannot explain why the Kelo backlash arose when it did; it can-
not fully explain how a small coalition of interest groups could 
overcome overwhelming and strongly-felt majority public opi-
nion; and, it cannot explain why states would pass ineffective 
reform laws, as opposed to simply doing nothing.  
As discussed above, the Kelo backlash arose in 2005 de-
spite the fact that Kelo made little change in existing Supreme 
Court takings doctrine.330 Interest group theory cannot explain 
this fact. After all, pro-property rights interest groups sought to 
restrain takings even before Kelo. Supporters of broad eminent 
domain power were satisfied with the status quo both before 
and afterwards. By contrast, the theory of rational political ig-
norance can readily account for the timing of the backlash. 
Second, the mere existence of interest group opposition 
does not explain why state legislators would choose to satisfy a 
few small interest groups while going against the preferences of 
the vast majority of the electorate.331 It is possible that the pro-
condemnation interest groups simply have more intense prefe-
rences about the issue than most of the opponents in the gener-
al public, and are therefore more likely to cast their votes based 
on politicians’ stances on the issue. However, 63% of the res-
pondents in the 2005 Saint Index survey said that they not only 
opposed Kelo, but felt “strongly” about it;332 more recent survey 
data shows that 43% of Americans “strongly support” reform 
legislation banning economic development takings.333 If just a 
fraction of the 63%—or even the 43%—were willing to let post-
Kelo reform influence their voting decisions, they would proba-
bly constitute a much larger voting bloc than all the pro-Kelo 
developers and government officials put together. For example, 
if 10% of those who felt “strongly” about the issue were willing 
to switch their votes as a result, they would constitute a voting 
bloc of about 4 to 6% of the electorate—more than enough to 
change the outcome of a close election. Presumably, that would 
give candidates strong incentives to support effective bans on 
economic development takings. 
For this reason, it is likely that, to the extent that interest 
group opposition was able to stymie effective post-Kelo reform 
and force the passage of merely cosmetic legislation, this result 
occurred only because most ordinary voters are unaware of 
 
 330. See supra Part I.A–B; see also Part III.B.1. 
 331. See supra Part I.B. 
 332. See supra text accompanying note 47.  
 333. See Somin, supra note 48, at 1940 tbl.2. 
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what is happening. Political ignorance is the handmaiden of in-
terest group power in the political process. Interest group pow-
er did play a role in the enactment of ineffective post-Kelo re-
forms. Without it, legislators would have little to lose from the 
enactment of stronger reform measures. But the legislators are 
able to satisfy interest group demands only because of public 
ignorance. Absent widespread ignorance, interest groups at 
odds with the majority of the general public would find it far 
more difficult to block eminent domain reform.  
Finally, interest group power cannot explain why some 
twenty-four states passed ineffective post-Kelo reform laws in-
stead of simply doing nothing. After all, pro-condemnation in-
terest groups would have been satisfied with the continuation 
of the pre-Kelo status quo, which in these states already al-
lowed the condemnation of property for almost any reason. 
Why waste valuable legislative time and attention on legisla-
tion that merely perpetuates the status quo? Interest group 
power alone cannot account for this. By contrast, political ig-
norance theory has a simple and compelling explanation for the 
enactment of ineffective reform laws: they could be used to per-
suade rationally ignorant voters that the something had been 
doneto solve the problem of economic development takings even 
if the new legislation would have little or no real impact.334  
The political ignorance hypothesis does not completely ex-
plain the pattern we have observed. For example, it does not 
account for the fact that a few state legislatures, notably Flori-
da, enacted strong reforms. However, it is more consistent with 
the available evidence than any alternative theory proposed so 
far. Certainly, it is better supported than either the argument 
that interest groups have stymied reform or the theory that 
elected officials will have little choice but to yield to the broad 
consensus of public opinion. Further research will be necessary 
to fully test the political ignorance hypothesis and compare it to 
rival theories. 
  CONCLUSION   
So far, the Kelo backlash has yielded far less effective 
reform than many expected. This result is striking in light of 
the overwhelming public opposition to the decision. Critics of 
Kelo will lament the result, while defenders may be heartened 
by it. Both can agree that the anti-Kelo backlash has not turned 
 
 334. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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out to be a complete substitute for strong judicial enforcement 
of public use limits on eminent domain. 
The evidence also supports the tentative conclusion that 
the relative paucity of effective reform is in large part a result 
of widespread political ignorance. This hypothesis is the only 
one proposed so far that can account for the conjunction of 
three anomalies: the sudden and massive public outrage 
against Kelo, despite the fact that the decision made few 
changes in existing law; the scarcity of effective reforms despite 
deep and broad public opposition to economic development tak-
ings; and the striking divergence between citizen-initiated refe-
renda and all post-Kelo laws enacted by other means. It is also 
supported by recent Saint Index survey data documenting 
widespread public ignorance of post-Kelo reform. 
There is much room for future research. For example, scho-
lars should make a systematic effort to explain why a few state 
legislatures, notably Florida, enacted very strong post-Kelo re-
forms despite the fact that their states engaged in extensive 
private to private condemnations previously. As yet, we have 
no clear explanation of why these states differed from most 
others. Detailed examination of their legislative processes 
might give us greater insight. 
The partial failure of the Kelo backlash also highlights an 
important limitation of claims that judicial review is not 
needed to protect individual rights that enjoy the backing of 
majority public opinion.335 Despite broad and strongly felt pub-
lic opposition to Kelo and economic development takings, both 
the federal government and the majority of states failed to 
enact effective reform legislation banning them. If public ignor-
ance could prevent the political process from providing effective 
protection for individual rights in such a high-profile case, it 
might also fall short in other cases where rights supported by 
majority opinion are at stake. Judicial review is not just a 
check on the tyranny of the majority. Sometimes, it may also be 
needed to protect us against the consequences of the majority’s 
political ignorance. 
The political response to Kelo is a striking example of pub-
lic backlash against an unpopular judicial decision. It also 
shows that backlash politics has its limits. 
 
 
 335. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table A1: 
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of “Threatened” Pri-
vate-to-Private Condemnations 
State Number of 
Threatened  
Takings336 
Effectiveness of Reform337 
Florida  2,055 Effective (L & LR) 
Maryland  1,110 Ineffective (L) 
California  635 Ineffective (L) 
New Jersey  589 No Reform 
Missouri  437 Ineffective (L) 
Ohio  331 Ineffective (L) 
Michigan  173 Effective (L & LR) 
Utah  167 Enacted Prior to Kelo 
Kentucky  161 Ineffective (L) 
Texas  118 Ineffective (L) 
Colorado  114 Ineffective (L) 
Pennsylvania  108 Effective (L) 
New York  89 No Reform 
Minnesota  83 Effective (L) 
Rhode Island  65 Ineffective (L) 
Connecticut  61 Ineffective (L) 
Indiana  51 Effective (L) 
Arkansas  40 No Reform 
Tennessee  37 Ineffective (L) 
Virginia  27 Effective (L) 
Nevada  15 Effective (L & CR) 
Vermont  15 Ineffective (L) 
West Virginia  12 Ineffective (L) 
Wisconsin  12 Ineffective (L) 
Nebraska  11 Ineffective (L) 
Arizona  10 Effective (CR) 
Illinois  9 Ineffective (L) 
Kansas  7 Effective (L) 
South Carolina  7 Ineffective (LR) 
Hawaii  5 No Reform 
Massachusetts  4 No Reform 
Oregon  2 Effective (CR) 
Delaware  0 Ineffective (L) 
Georgia  0 Effective (L & LR) 
Idaho  0 Effective (L) 
 
 336. See BERLINER, supra note 66. This data on known eminent domain 
condemnations by state includes developments from 1998 to 2002.  Id. at 8–9.  
 337. As determined in January 2008.  
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South Dakota  0 Effective (L) 
Wyoming  0 Effective (L) 
Alabama  0 Effective (L) 
Alaska  0 Ineffective (L) 
Iowa  0 Ineffective (L) 
Louisiana  0 Effective (LR) 
Maine  0 Ineffective (L) 
Mississippi  0 No Reform 
Montana  0 Ineffective (L) 
New Hampshire  0 Effective (L & LR) 
New Mexico  0 Effective (L) 
North Carolina  0 Ineffective (L) 
North Dakota  0 Effective (CR) 
Oklahoma  0 No Reform 
Washington 0 No Reform 
L=Reform enacted by state legislature; CR=Reform enacted by citizen-
initiated referendum; LR=Reform enacted by legislature-initiated referendum. 
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Table A2: 
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of Private-to-Private 
Condemnations Per 1 Million people 
State 2005  
Population338 
Takings339/ 
1M people 
Effectiveness of 
Reform340 
Pennsylvania  12,429,616 202.5 Effective (L) 
Kansas  2,744,687 56.5 Effective (L) 
Maryland  5,600,388 22.7 Ineffective (L) 
Michigan  10,120,860 13.6 Effective (L & LR) 
Rhode Island  1,076,189 11.2 Ineffective (L) 
Connecticut  3,510,297 8.8 Ineffective (L) 
Ohio  11,464,042 7.9 Ineffective (L) 
Virginia  7,567,465 7.7 Effective (L) 
Oklahoma  3,547,884 6.5 No Reform 
California  36,132,147 6.2 Ineffective (L) 
New Jersey  8,717,925 5.9 No Reform 
Tennessee  5,962,959 4.9 Ineffective (L) 
Colorado  4,665,177 4.9 Ineffective (L) 
West Virginia 1,816,856 4.4 Ineffective (L) 
Florida  17,789,864 3.8 Effective (L & LR) 
Missouri  5,800,310 3.1 Ineffective (L) 
New York  19,254,630 3 No Reform 
Arizona  5,939,292 1.9 Effective (CR) 
Minnesota  5,132,799 1.8 Effective (L) 
Alabama  4,557,808 1.8 Effective (L) 
Washington  6,287,759 1.7 No Reform 
Kentucky  4,173,405 1.7 Ineffective (L) 
North Dakota  636,677 1.6 Effective (CR) 
Maine  1,321,505 1.5 Ineffective (L) 
Iowa  2,966,334 1.3 Ineffective (L) 
Nevada  2,414,807 1.2 Effective (L & CR) 
Louisiana  4,523,628 1.1 Effective (LR) 
Mississippi  2,921,088 1 No Reform 
Massachusetts  6,398,743 0.8 No Reform 
Illinois  12,763,371 0.6 Ineffective (L) 
Indiana  6,271,973 0.6 Effective (L) 
Nebraska  1,758,787 0.6 Ineffective (L) 
Texas  22,859,968 0.5 Ineffective (L) 
Arkansas  2,779,154 0.4 No Reform 
North Carolina  8,683,242 0.1 Ineffective (L) 
 
 338. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION 
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO 
JULY 1, 2005 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-
ann-est2005.html. 
 339. Some takings affected more than one property. See BERLINER, supra 
note 66 (reporting filed condemnations per state). 
 340. As determined in January 2008.  
 2009] POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO 2175 
 
Alaska  663,661 0 Ineffective (L) 
Delaware  843,524 0 Ineffective (L) 
Georgia  9,072,576 0 Effective (L & LR) 
Idaho  1,429,096 0 Effective (L) 
South Dakota  775,933 0 Effective (L) 
Wyoming  509,294 0 Effective (L) 
Hawaii 1,275,194 0 No Reform 
Montana 935,670 0  Ineffective (L) 
New Hampshire 1,309,940 0 Effective (L & LR) 
New Mexico 1,928,384 0 Effective (L) 
Oregon 3,641,056 0 Effective (CR) 
South Carolina 4,255,083 0 Ineffective (LR) 
Utah 2,469,585 0 
Enacted Prior to 
Kelo 
Vermont 623,050 0 Ineffective (L) 
Wisconsin 5,536,201 0 Ineffective (L) 
L=Reform enacted by state legislature; CR=Reform enacted by citizen-
initiated referendum; LR=Reform enacted by legislature-initiated referendum. 
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Table A3: 
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of Threatened Private-
to-Private Condemnations Per 1 Million People 
State 2005  
Popula-
tion341 
Threatened  
Takings342  
/1M people 
Effectiveness of 
Reform343 
Maryland  5,600,388 198.2 Ineffective (L) 
Florida  17,789,864 115.5 Effective (L & LR) 
Missouri  5,800,310 75.3 Ineffective (L) 
Utah  2,469,585 67.6 Enacted Prior to Kelo 
New Jersey  8,717,925 67.6 No Reform 
Rhode Island  1,076,189 60.4 Ineffective (L) 
Kentucky  4,173,405 38.6 Ineffective (L) 
Ohio  11,464,042 28.9 Ineffective (L) 
Colorado  4,665,177 24.4 Ineffective (L) 
Vermont  623,050 24.1 Ineffective (L) 
California  36,132,147 17.6 Ineffective (L) 
Connecticut  3,510,297 17.4 Ineffective (L) 
Michigan  10,120,860 17.1 Effective (L & LR) 
Minnesota  5,132,799 16.2 Effective (L) 
Arkansas  2,779,154 14.4 No Reform 
Pennsylvania  12,429,616 8.7 Effective (L) 
Indiana  6,271,973 8.1 Effective (L) 
West Virginia  1,816,856 6.6 Ineffective (L) 
Nebraska  1,758,787 6.3 Ineffective (L) 
Nevada  2,414,807 6.2 Effective (L &CR) 
Tennessee  5,962,959 6.2 Ineffective (L) 
Texas  22,859,968 5.2 Ineffective (L) 
New York  19,254,630 4.6 No Reform 
Hawaii  1,275,194 3.9 No Reform 
Virginia  7,567,465 3.6 Effective (L) 
Kansas  2,744,687 2.6 Effective (L) 
Wisconsin  5,536,201 2.2 Ineffective (L) 
Arizona  5,939,292 1.7 Effective (CR) 
South Carolina  4,255,083 1.6 Ineffective (LR) 
Illinois  12,763,371 0.7 Ineffective (L) 
Massachusetts  6,398,743 0.6 No Reform 
Oregon  3,641,056 0.5 Effective (CR) 
Delaware  843,524 0 Ineffective (L) 
Georgia  9,072,576 0 Effective (L & 
 
 341. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 338. 
 342. Some takings affected more than one property. See BERLINER, supra 
note 66. 
 343. As determined in January 2008.  
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LR) 
Idaho  1,429,096 0 Effective (L) 
South Dakota  775,933 0 Effective (L) 
Wyoming  509,294 0 Effective (L) 
Alabama  4,557,808 0 Effective (L) 
Alaska  663,661 0 Ineffective (L) 
Iowa  2,966,334 0 Ineffective (L) 
Louisiana  4,523,628 0 Effective (LR) 
Maine  1,321,505 0 Ineffective (L) 
Mississippi  2,921,088 0 No Reform 
Montana  935,670 0 Ineffective (L) 
New Hampshire  1,309,940 0 Effective (L & LR) 
New Mexico  1,928,384 0 Effective (L) 
North Carolina  8,683,242 0 Ineffective (L) 
North Dakota  636,677 0 Effective (CR) 
Oklahoma  3,547,884 0 No Reform 
Washington  6,287,759 0 No Reform 
L=Reform enacted by state legislature; CR=Reform enacted by citizen-
initiated referendum; LR=Reform enacted by legislature-initiated referendum. 
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  APPENDIX B: 2007 SAINT INDEX SURVEY QUESTIONS 
ON POST-KELO REFORM344   
Question 9.  
In 2005, the US Supreme Court ruled that the government 
could take private property by eminent domain to give it to 
another private owner to promote economic development. Since 
that ruling, some states have passed new laws that restrict the 
government’s power to take private property. Do you happen to 
know if your state is one of those that has passed such a law? 
A. Yes, my state has enacted at least one such law 
B. No, it has not enacted any laws like that 
C. Don’t know 
 
Question 10 (asked only of those who chose answer A on 
Question 9). 
Do you think that the new laws in your state will be effec-
tive in preventing the condemnation of private property for 
economic development? 
A. Very effective 
B. Somewhat effective 
C. Mostly ineffective 
D. Completely ineffective 
E. Don’t know 
Note: For purposes of Table 6, I counted the first two an-
swers as “effective” and the second two as “ineffective” and 
marked “don’t know” as automatically mistaken. Respondents 
in states that had passed ineffective reforms were given credit 
for “correct” answers if they picked either C or D. Those in 
states with effective laws similarly counted as “correct” if they 
chose either A or B. 
 
 
 344. See 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstns. 9 & 10. 
